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EVEN MORE HONEST THAN EVER
BEFORE: ABANDONING PRETENSE
AND RECREATING LEGITIMACY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Leslie Gielow Jacobs*
In this article, Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs asserts that
the Supreme Court, by becoming mired in a formalistic mode of
reporting decisions, has sacrificed the legitimacy of its interpretive process. She argues that this sacrifice stems from contemporary Supreme Court opinions' failure to acknowledge alternatives and value judgments that inevitably are a part of decision
making. She explores several recent decisions by the Court, noting the detrimental impact of formalism in each. Professor Jacobs then suggests a new method of reporting, defining, and
structuring its components into a method which can recreate legitimacy in the interpretive process.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Almost one hundred years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., noted that the "logical form" in which courts deliver judicial opinions conceals an "often ... inarticulate and unconscious judgment"
which, instead of the reasons the courts recite in the opinions, is "the
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. " 1 Despite this astute observation, little in the presentation of constitutional decision making
has changed. 2 By contrast, the widely shared foundational assump• Assistant Professor. McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. B.A. 1982, Wesleyan University; J.D. /985, University of Michigan Law School.
Thanks to Alan Brownstein, Julie Davies, Joshua Dressler, Eugene /1/ovsky, Matthew Jacobs, and the participants in the McGeorge Faculty Scholarship Workshop for providing helpful
criticism on earlier drafts of this article. and to Spencer Skeen for his research assistance. This
article is dedicated to the memory of Andrew Cangelosi. who supplied beach reading that proved
inspirational.
I. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897).
2. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 865
(I 988). Posner asserts:
•
Most judicial opinions even in the toughest cases depict the process of reasoning as a logical
deduction ... from previous decisions or from statutes viewed as transparent sources of rules,
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tions that could make this type of logical presentation meaningful no
longer exist. 3 This divergence between judicial practice and modern
recognitions has profound constitutional implications. Although the
Supreme Court acknowledges that public acceptance of its constitutional decisions is crucial to its legitimacy,• it remains wedded to a
method of presenting these decisions that has become increasingly untenable and, perhaps, incredible. The resulting-and worsening--crisis of legitimacy stems from the disjunction between the rhetoric of the Court's opinions and the necessary reality of the
constitutional decision-making process. 6
The question of legitimacy is, quite simply, why should the nation-lawyers or laypeople--continue to respect and follow the constitutional meanings articulated by as few as five individuals who happen to sit on the Supreme Court? The traditional response to this
question is twofold. First, the Constitution, a document of democratic
pedigree, 6 the general scheme of which we continue to affirm, 7 quite
plausibly commits the function of interpreting the Constitution to the
judiciary.8 Second, judges, a particularly high breed of lawyer, have
expertise superior to laypeople in examining the sources of constitutional meaning-the text, its history, and previous cases interpreting
it-so the constitutional meanings that they articulate are especially
likely to be correct. 9 These reasons have been thought to render the
Court's constitutional decisions worthy of respect and obedience, even
by those individuals who may disagree with a particular result.

and, consistent with the logical form, imply that even the very toughest case has a right and a
wrong answer and only a fool would doubt that the author of the opinion had hit on the right
one.
/d.
3. See, e.g., Morton J. Horowitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv . 30, 33
(1993) ("As law in the modern world has increasingly cut itself loose from its once-powerful
grounding in religious sources of authority, it has been challenged to acknowledge, along with
every other secular field of knowledge, the implications not only of historical change, but also
changes in historical consciousness.") (citation omitted) .
4. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2814 (1992).
5. Others also have seen a crisis brewing. See Id. at 2885 (Scalia, J ., dissenting) (comparing
the Court's decision to the Dred Scott decision that led to the Civil War); Horowitz, supra note 3,
at 33; Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373, 401-02 (1982) ("The decreasing propensity of the body politic to accord the Supreme Court ultimate authority in constitutional
interpretation may portend a[] .. . deep[) constitutional crisis. ") .
6. This pedigree, however, is not perfect. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 38 (2d ed. 1991) ("[T]he 'we' [who participated in the democratic formation of the Constitution] excluded large numbers of people, including all women, all Indians, and all blacks." ).
7. See infra note 46.
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); see also PAUL M. BATOR ET
AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE fEDERAL COURTS AND THE fEDERAL SYSTEM 8-10 (3d ed. 1988);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15-16 (1986).
9. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 25-26 ("[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess. Judges have, or should have, the
leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of
government.").
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The traditional model of judicial reasoning is formalism-that is,
decision makers deduce constitutional meanings from acknowledged
authoritative sources, which themselves have determinate meanings. 10
Formal legitimacy addresses the crucial concern that unelected constitutional decision makers interpret the law rather than make the law
according to their own personal preferences. 11 It also demonstrates
that the decision is entitled to respect and obedience because the foundations that lead to the more particular decision are presumptively
affirmed by all. 12
The modern dilemma is that formalism, as the sole test of the
legitimacy of the constitutional interpretive process, is no longer tenable.18 All constitutional interpretation requires value judgments. 14
Where the value judgments will be most obvious, however, is where
they are most hotly disputed. 16 It is, of course, in these instances of
deep controversy that the Court needs most to maintain the legiti-

10. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 169
( 1985) ("The classical interpretation of the demand for legitimacy treats it as a demand for legal
formalism in adjudication."); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 181 (1986) (defining
formalism as "the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from premises accepted
as authoritative").
I!. See BURTON, supra note 10, at 169 ("The ... model of formal legitimacy ... relies on
logic to exclude all personal value preferences from the judicial decision.").
12. See, e.g., Robert H. Bark, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. I (1972); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. I (1959); see a/so RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 40
( 1990) ("The only prerequisite to being a formalist is having supreme confidence in one's premises
and in one's methods of deriving conclusions from them").
13. My point is not, as some have argued, that logical reasoning is useless as a means of
legitimating constitutional decisions. See David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
243, 243-51 (! 984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1691-700 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv.
379, 400-18 (1985); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. I, 9-25 (1984); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 570-72 (1983). Reliance upon principles in constitutional decision making and the discipline of stating them in the judicial opinion help demonstrate the decision's legitimacy. See infra
part II.A; see also KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 13-56 (1992); Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism] (arguing that "formalism"-meaning "decisionmaking according to rule" -should not be categorically condemned).
My point is simply that a formal justification in a judicial opinion is not always enough to demonstrate its legitimacy. Even those who argue that judicial reliance on formalism can be valuable
tend to concede this. See. e.g., Rolf Sartorius, The Justification of the Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICS 171, 173 (1968), reprinted in I LEGAL REASONING 127, 129 (Aulis Aarnio & D. Neil MacCormick eds. , 1993) ("I have no quarrel with the view that ... principles of 'morality, justice,
social policy or commonsense' ... can provide grounds for the justification of judicial decisions in
hard cases."); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. C'\L· L. REv. 399, 407 (1985) [hereinafter
Schauer, Easy Cases] (acknowledging that some cases are "hard").
14. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 101 (1993) ("There is . . . no
way for those interpreting the Constitution to avoid moral decisions, even major ones.").
15. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 13, at 514 (noting that "terms, like 'liberty' and
'equality' are pervasively indeterminate" ).
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macy of its decisions, particularly as against those many individuals
who passionately disagree. 16
The modern recognition of the inevitability of value judgments in
constitutional adjudication, coupled with the traditional assumptions
about the formal requirements of legitimacy, creates the Court's current contradictory and potentially self-destructive behavior.
"[L]egitimacy," as the Court has recognized, "is a product of [both]
substance and perception." 17 As for the substance of the Court's constitutional interpretation, I do not think that any member of the Court
today really believes that it meets the requirements of formal legitimacy. Rather, I am convinced that the Justices know that they must
make value judgments in interpreting the Constitution. 18
Moreover, while the Justices most likely do-and, I think,
should-believe that their constitutional interpretations are "correct,"
I doubt they view them as uniquely so. Instead, they attempt to reach
the best possible result in the face of complex and conflicting potential
meanings.
My concerns stem initially from the contradiction between these
intuitions about the substance of the Court's constitutional interpretive process and its manner of attempting to create the perception of
interpretive legitimacy. The vehicle by which the Court communicates
with the American public is the judicial opinion, which demonstrates
the legitimacy of the decision by "bear[ing] witness that it was
reached through the discipline of the pattern of the law." 19 Although
I suspect (and hope) that the Justices have abandoned the idea of
formal legitimacy as the model of constitutional interpretation, they
most certainly have not done so in the explanation of their decisions.
Their decisions consistently portray the constitutional meanings as
flowing inevitably from the traditional sources of meaning, and deride

16. See David Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CAL. L. REv. 178, 198
(1984) ("[W]hat needs to be justified is . . . what we do to people who are governed by the law.")
(emphasis omitted).
17. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992) (P.Jurality opinion).
18. For example, many constitutional decisions turn on the result of balancing a number of
different factors. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 944 (1987). But the Constitution neither dictates the tests nor indicates how to
quantify the factors in any given context. Nor does it assign numerical multipliers to these factors
once we have (somehow) measured their magnitude. It is difficult to deny that value judgments
drive the quantification of these factors and the inherent multipliers we assign to them. I suspect
that the Justices, perceptive and intelligent all, do not deny this, at least to themselves. See. e.g.,
Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic
Theory, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1049, 1065 (1979). Bennett notes:
Usually there will be no way to quantify or otherwise objectify ... cost-benefit balancing
[under the Equal Protection Clause] .... To recognize that rationality is a function of costs,
benefits, and alternatives is to recognize that judicial value judgments at some level are unavoidable even when applying [the] most minimal of constitutional standards.
/d.
19. Edward H. Levi, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, 32 U. CHI . L. REv. 395, 409
(1965).
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alternate interpretations offered within the same decision as misguided or incorrect. To me, most recent constitutional decisions look
like shouting matches rather than the honest and thoughtful explanation more likely to engender the respect and willingness to obey that
legitimacy requires. 20
The much more dangerous aspect of the contradiction between
the Court's method and its presentation, however, is that the formalist
assumptions as to presentation doom the Court to fail by its own standards and prejudge the interpretive method that will appear most
plausible. 21 Originalists have repeatedly accused the Court of simultaneously obscuring the value judgments it makes in its constitutional
interpretation and arguing that its chosen method of interpretation
defines "the exclusive source" for principles of interpretation "that are
independent of the judge's preferences." 22 These accusations of deception will be correct and will undermine respect for the Court's decisions as long as the Court adheres to the formalist assumptions of
presentation. Moreover, these assumptions will channel the Court's
decision-making method toward the sources of meaning advocated by
originalists, thereby obscuring the value judgment to rely upon these
sources in the first place.
For those of us who believe that originalist assumptions about
constitutional interpretation often do not promote the best constitutional meaning, it is particularly important to break this self-defeating
cycle by exposing the value judgment to rely upon those sources of
meaning for what they are. The Court must abandon the pretense
that formalism can legitimate completely its decision making and accept the challenge of legitimating its constitutional value judgments
by other methods.
I suspect that the Court clings to a formalist method of presentation not so much because of its perceived effectiveness, but because it
lacks a plausible alternative. 28 In this article, therefore, I propose a
method of constitutional decision making and presentation that explicitly embraces, rather than implicitly denies, the inevitable value judgments. Part II uses several recent constitutional decisions to illustrate
the ways that the formalist assumptions apparent in the Court's opin-

20. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 75 (1930) (speculating that the
authoritarian tone of judicial decisions stemmed from the childish need for an omnipotent authority figure); Posner, supra note 2, at 834 (noting that "judges' persistence in trying to force legal
reasoning into the mold of logic ... suggests ... a kind of desperation").
21. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 103 (1989) (Most modern philosophies
"prejudge [visions of the good] irrevocably . . . not because they are inspired by one side but
because this inspiration is hidden, where it can't come up for debate.").
22. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 265 (1990).
23. See Posner, supra note 2, at 834 (asserting that judges' continued adherence to formalism in judicial opinion writing "suggests a lack either of confidence or sophistication in alternative
modes of reasoning").
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ions undermine its constitutional interpretive legitimacy. Part III sets
out the components of a new legitimacy that the Court can obtain
despite the fact that it must make controversial value judgments in
constitutional adjudication. Part IV combines these components into a
structured method of decision making that, when followed and set out
in the Court's opinions, can earn the Court the legitimacy it so desperately seeks.
II.

THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE RHETORIC AND THE
REALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETIVE LEGITIMACY

The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 24
contains its most recent and thorough explication of its view of its own
constitutional interpretive legitimacy. Casey therefore provides an excellent starting point for an examination of the widening gulf between
the Court's view and the necessary reality of constitutional interpretive method. In a joint opinion, a plurality of the Court affirmed the
"central holding" of Roe v. Wade2 r. that the "liberty" guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause includes a woman's
right to choose to have an abortion.28 According to the members of
the Court, the decision whether to affirm the constitutional interpretation established in Roe raised questions of "legitimacy." 27
The Court's legitimacy is the "source of [its] authority" 28 and is
"a product of [both] substance and perception." 29 The substance of
the Court's legitimacy is "the warrant for the Court's decisions in the
Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the
Court draws." 30 The perception of legitimacy comes from the expression of its substance in "the Court's opinions. " 31 By making "legally
principled decisions" and displaying their "principled character" in
judicial opinions, the Court can preserve its legitimacy and, hence, its
authority "to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare
what it demands." 32
The Court's description of the substance and perception of legitimacy reflects some widely shared understandings. Substantively, the

24. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2796 (1992) (plurality opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter); id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 2873 (Scalia, J ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
25. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
26. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816 (plurality opinion).
27. /d. at 2814 (plurality opinion).
28. !d. (plurality opinion).
29. /d. (plurality opinion).
30. /d. (plurality opinion).
31. ld. (plurality opinion).
32. /d. (plurality opinion).
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issue of legitimacy arises because of the nature and limits of "the
power conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United
States and specifically upon [the Supreme] Court. " 33 In our constitu~
tional democracy, laws must be created democratically. Because
members of the judiciary are not elected, they cannot make law legiti~
mately. Instead, they interpret the meanings of laws which another
branch of government has created democratically. Thus, the crux of
interpretive legitimacy is that constitutional decision makers stay
within their authorized role of interpreting the meaning of the Consti~
tution;3 " their decisions must be fairly traceable to the constitutional
text. In a "[n]ation of people who aspire to live according to the rule
of law," 311 the content of the "law" must be fairly distinguishable from
the decision makers' personal preferences. 36 Consequently, constitu~
tional meaning which fluctuates with "change[s] in [the Court's]
membership" 37 would severely damage the Court's legitimacy. The
Court's function is "to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its]
own moral code." 38 The Casey plurality, therefore, reached its result
despite any "personal reluctance" of particular Justices. 39
Although legitimacy in constitutional interpretation requires this
transcendence of personal preference, it also requires a transcendence
of generational preference; the Constitution embodies "ideas and aspi~
rations that must survive more ages than one." 4 ° Constitutional prin~
ciples similarly must be acceptable and affirmable by the broad public

33. /d. (plurality opinion).
34. STONE ET AL., supra note 6, at 760; Daniel A. Farber, The Origina/ism Debate: A
Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086 (1989); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution
as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. I , I (1984).
35. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816 (plurality opinion).
36. See, e.g., id. at 2806 (stating that the process of supplying content to constitutional text
"has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take
them") (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 , 542 (1961) (Harlan, J ., dissenting from dismissal
on jurisdictional grounds)); id. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (accusing the Court of "not wish[ing] to be fettered by any ... limitations on its
preferences"); BICKEL, supra note 8, at 16 (noting the potential countermajoritarian difficulty of
judicial review); Bork, supra note 12, at 8 (noting the Court's willingness to abandon the idea of
original understanding); Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS.
L. REv. 679, 704 (noting the problem where "Justices inevitably seem to impose their personal
values on society"); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term- Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. I, 12-13 (1979) (asserting that judicial interpretation should not rely
on "personal beliefs"); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800 (1983) (noting the Court's rejection of
the Framers' intent of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown v. Board of Education).
37. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mitchell v. W .T. Grant, 416 U.S.
600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
38. Id. at 2806 (plurality opinion).
39. /d. a t 2812 (plurality opinion).
40. /d. at ~833 (plurality opinion); see also BICKEL, supra note 8, at 58 (the function of
judicial review is to "enunciat[e) and apply[] certain enduring values of our society"); Owen M.
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 762-63 (1982) ("[T]he Constitution
. . . embodies the fundamental public values of our society.").
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that is subject to constitutional commands. 41 Of course, this broad
public does not necessarily mean the momentary popular majority.42
Fundamental and enduring principles must differ somehow from the
political preferences of the day or they would establish no limit at all
on the actions of the other governmental branches!3
Fidelity to the broad principles understood to be embodied in the
Constitution is thus one aspect of the legitimacy of constitutional decisions!• Another aspect of that legitimacy, however, is that the principles used in constitutional decision making have continuing significance in the present day! 11 That is, continuing allegiance to
constitutional decisions, like our more general allegiance to the structure of government, depends upon a general public perception that the
Constitution and the meaning the Court gives it are generally valuable, despite the inevitable disagreement of some with any particular
decision. 46
Up to this point, the Court offers a widely affirmed definition of
the substance of its constitutional interpretive legitimacy. Its essence
is that the Court should interpret the Constitution according to legal
constraints rather than personal preferences and in a way worthy of
continuing respect. But in its assumptions about the requirements to
establish the second aspect of legitimacy-its public perception-the

41. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814 (plurality opinion) (Legitimacy " shows itself in the people's
acceptance of the Judiciary" and the "principled justifications" it offers.).
42. This point is particularly apposite with respect to constitutional provisions that protect
minority rights. See. e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7 ( 1980) (noting that majority rule "is not the whole story"); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (finding it "upsetting" that the meaning of the Constitution might depend upon "some kind of social consensus"); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420
(1908) ("Constitutional questions . . . are not settled by even a consensus of present public
opinion.").
43. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 42, at 7.
44. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 34, at 1086 ("Almost no one believes that the original
understanding is wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation."); Michael J.
Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitution "Interpretation,"
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 569-70 (stating that the issue that divides originalists and nonoriginalists
is whether "to accord [the ratifiers' normative judgments] authoritative status").
45. See, e.g., SuNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 100 (suggesting that constitutional legitimacy
comes from "some amalgam of substantive political reasons"); Robin L. West, Constitutional
Skepticism, 72 B.U. L REV. 765 (1992) (suggesting that we ask whether the values which the
Constitution embodies are good ones, worthy of respect and continued allegiance); see also Bruce
A. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013, 1023, 1049 (1984) (noting the
intertemporal difficulty of giving effect to the will of a majority now dead) ; Kenneth L. Karst,
Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE LJ. 447. 486 (asserting that the Constitution designed a
framework for governing society as it was perceived by men and run by men); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U CtN. L REV. 849, 856-61 (1989) (acknowledging that, in
some instances, originalism may result in meanings that are unacceptable, even to originalists, in
the present day).
46. See, e.g., BuRTON, supra note 10, at 201 (stating that in assessing legitimacy, "the
normative question- whether the legal and political system as a whole merits the allegiance of the
people-is also important.").
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Court establishes the contradiction that is bound to destroy the legitimacy that it seeks to demonstrate.
Clearly, an important function of the judicial opinion is to create
the perception of interpretive legitimacy. In particular, the written
opinion demonstrates that the decision "is not just a bald exercise of
coercion," or "an expression of the judge's personal predilections."''
Rather, the written decision "bear[s] witness that it was reached
through the discipline of the pattern of the law." 48 Even if the opinion
does not reflect the decision maker's actual reasoning process,'9 the
exercise of creating the opinion provides an important constraint on
the decision maker's ability to reach any desired result. 110 Moreover,
the judicial opinion functions not only to demonstrate that something
constrained the decision-making process, but also that the constraints
were appropriate. 111 Thus, displaying the decision-making process in
the judicial opinion enhances its legitimacy both by demonstrating the
difference between the result and the decision maker's personal preferences, and by offering the display as worthy of public respect. 112
The damaging contradiction derives from the assumption, apparent in the opinions of all the Justices, that creating the perception of
legitimacy requires a presentation that portrays the decision-making
process as meeting the demands of formalism. 113 Quite briefly, formal
legitimacy requires that decision makers logically derive their decisions from foundational authorizing principles, which have a legitimating pedigree. 114 In its strongest form, the theory provides that only
"one right answer" exists to many, or most, legal questions.1111 Formal
47. MARTIN P. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 6-10 (1984); see also Levi, supra note 19, at
411 ("[T]he function of articulated judicial reasoning is to . . . giv[e) some assurance that private
views are not masquerading behind public views.").
48. Levi, supra note 19, at 409.
49. See FRANK, supra note 20; Martin P. Golding, A Note on Discovery and Justification
in Science and Law, in J USTIFICATION, Nomos XXVIII 124, 138 (1986) (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds.), reprinted in I LEGAL REASONING 109 (Aulis Aarnio & D. Neil MacCormick eds., 1992); Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
''Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 ( 1929).
50. GOLDING, supra note 47, at 9 (" [R]easons ... operate as controls on the process of
deliberation.").
51. /d. (" The reasons will have to be regarded by [the audience] as good reasons for the
decision.").
52. /d. Golding writes:
The fact that rational individuals are not persuaded by just any reasons that a judge could
conceivably give has an important consequence: the reasons have to be more than an expression of the judge's personal predilections.... [T]he judge will want his or her reasons to be
reasons that independent observers, especially other judges and lawyers, will find acceptable.
/d.
53. See, e.g., BuRTON, supra note I 0, at 170 ( Formal legitimacy "often is taken to define
legitimacy for adjudication in the U.S. legal system."); M ichael S . Moore, The Semantics of
Judging, 54 S. CAL L. REv. 151 , 160 (" [F]ormalism is celftral to our ideas of law." ) ; Posner,
supra note 2, at 832.
54. See sources cited supra note I 0.
55. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 22, at 2-3; Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW,
MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 58 (P.M .S. Hacker & J . Raz eds., 1977).
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legitimacy further requires that decision makers determine the Constitution's meaning by reference to its text and history. 118 These foundational meanings, assuming that the decision makers can discern
them accurately, 117 legitimate the decisions as properly grounded in
the Constitution, independent of the decision makers' preferences, and
worthy of continuing respect.
I am quite sure that none of the Justices really believe that the
Court's constitutional interpretation process, at least in difficult cases,
can meet the demands of formal legitimacy. Instead, formalism is a
theory of interpretation that has been widely acknowledged as impossible to achieve. It is an illusion that was sustainable in a time of
widespread belief in eternal and discoverable universal truths, 118 when
the citizenry deemed appropriate to evaluate constitutional interpretive legitimacy was relatively homogenous. 119 Now, however, almost
everyone agrees that the traditional sources of constitutional meaning
do not give definitive answers to difficult constitutional questions. 80
Once outside these sources, the general recognition of the situated nature of truth means that decision makers cannot appeal to universally
shared understandings to support the chosen constitutional meaning. 81
Moreover, the entry of previously excluded groups as participants in
the democratic community,82 as well as the general diversification of
groups represented in American society, means that the community
that the Constitution addresses reflects an increasingly wide variety of
perspectives on all sorts of issues, including the appropriate principles
to inform constitutional meaning.

56. BURTON, supra note I 0, at 170-71.
57. Of course, the inability to discern these meanings with certainty is the fatal flaw of
formal legitimacy. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 2, at 833 (noting that the success of formal reasoning requires that the major premise be an "unchallenged given").
58. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 3 (tracing the origin of the view of constitutional meaning as unchanging).
59. See. e.g., Paul Brest, This Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REv. 204, 230 (1980) ("[T]he interests of black Americans were not adequately represented in
the adoption of the Constitution of 1787 or the fourteenth amendment. Whatever moral consensus
the Civil War Amendments embodied was among white male property-holders and not the population as a whole." ).
60. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 42, at 1-73 (demonstrating the indeterminacy of a number of
theories of constitutional interpretation); Steven L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the
Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 847
(1985) (constitutional text is "charitably described as indeterminate"); Barry Friedman, Dialogue
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 649 (1993) ("[T]he Constitution ... presents an
easy case on which there is widespread agreement [about its indeterminacy]."); see also BoRK,
supra note 22, at 163 ("The result of the search [for original understanding] is never perfection ..
. ."); Scalia, supra note 45, at 856 (noting "the difficulty of applying [originalism] correctly").
61. E.g., SuNSTEJN, supra note 14, at 93 ("Reasonable people disagree about what [the
Constitution] means.").
62. Since the ratification of the Constitution, African Americans, women, and individuals
between the ages of 18 and 21 have received the right to vote. U.S. CoNST. amends. XV, XIX,
XXVI.
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The Casey plurality indeed hints several times that its decision
does not necessarily represent the inevitable derivation of a determinate constitutional meaning from established constitutional principles.63 Nevertheless, the plurality's general description of the Court's
decision-making process, as well as the overall authoritarian tone of
presentation, contradicts these scattered acknowledgements of the inevitability of value judgments in constitutional adjudication. Under
the plurality's view, a change in constitutional principle "is ... perceived corr~ctly[] as ... a statement that a prior decision was wrong"
and thus undermines the Court's legitimacy.u Acknowledging the validity of alternate choices of constitutional meaning from the one
adopted in the opinion would undermine the opinion's legitimacy. Instead, these choices must be declared "tempting," but "inconsistent
with our law." 86 To persuade the public of its legitimacy, a justification for a constitutional decision "must be beyond dispute. " 88
But dispute is exactly what the formalist mode of presentation
engenders. Some of the plurality's "principled justifications" relate to
the force of stare decisis.67 Others more directly relate to the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty guarantee and the nature of
the abortion decision. 68 They all, however, represent value choices that
are not dictated uniquely by the traditional sources of constitutional
meaning that the plurality cites. This fact, contrasted with the formalist and authoritarian mode of the plurality's presentation,69 establishes
the fundamental contradiction that undermines the legitimacy of the
constitutional meaning that it articulates.
Because of this contradiction, the dissenters can accurately accuse the Justices in the majority of crafting the law according to their
own preferences in a way that is not entitled to respect. The plurality's version of stare decisis is "newly minted;"70 its "notion of reli-

63. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 , 2806 (1992) (plurality) (constitutional
interpretation requires the exercise of "reasoned judgment," which is not mechanical); id. at 2808
("(W)e appreciate the weight of the arguments made on behalf of the State ....").
64. /d. at 2815 (plurality).
65. /d. at 2805 (plurality) (noting that it is tempting, but incorrect, to adopt a theory of
constitutional interpretation that limits the meaning of liberty in the due process clause to "those
rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal interference by the express provisions
of the first eight amendments to the Constitution"); id. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[T)he Court's temptation is ... towards systematically eliminating checks
upon its own power; and it succumbs."); see also BORIC, supra note 22, at 1-2 (noting that it is
tempting, but incorrect, to adopt a theory of interpretation that allows the Court to expand upon
express constitutional provisions).
66. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814 (plurality).
67. /d. at 2816 (plurality).
68. ld. at 2804-08 (plurality).
69. See Holmes, supra note I, at 457-66 (noting this mode of opinion writing); see also
Posner, supra note 2, at 865 (same).
70. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) .
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ance," "unconventional and unconvincing;" 71 its enunciated standard,
"rootless;" 72 and its derivation of its result from that standard, unfaithful to it. 73 As the Chief Justice points out, the Court's concern
that it not be perceived to "surrender to political pressure" has "two
sides." 74 According to Justice Scalia, the reasons which the Court in
Roe and its progeny offer "beg[] the question" by assuming a controversial moral judgment about the status of the fetus that in fact needs
a defense. 711 These criticisms, when not merely plausible but true, undermine the core aspects of the Court's legitimacy.
By failing to acknowledge the inevitable value choices in constitutional interpretation, the plurality hides, even from itself, the need at
least to attempt to explain them. 78 That is, the plurality deems sufficient the recitation of the formal sources and their chosen meanings.
Once it becomes apparent, however, that the chosen meanings are not
uniquely correct, as asserted, it also becomes apparent that the plurality has offered no justification for its choice. 77 The choices, quite accurately, appear to be judicial fiat and nothing contradicts the suspicion
that they stem from the personal preferences of the decision makers.
These recognitions undermine a legitimacy that depends upon the perception that constitutional decision makers are in some significant
sense bound by "law." Moreover, by failing to offer any real explanation for its choices, the plurality loses the second aspect of legitimacy,
which is respect. After all, an unexplained choice is difficult to respect.78 It is also difficult to respect decision makers who either do not
understand fully or do not want to acknowledge their constitutional
interpretative process. 79
Because of the inconsistency between the plurality's decisional
method and its portrayal of it, Justice Scalia accurately can accuse
the plurality of "decorat[ing] a value judgment and conceal[ing] a
political choice."80 In fact, recognizing that the Court is making value
judgments in constitutional interpretation necessarily changes the ef-

71. /d. at 2862 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. /d. at 2878 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. /d. at 2861 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) .
74. !d. at 2865 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2815).
75. /d. at 2875 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973)
("We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.").
76. See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296 (1990) (arguing that the
effect of this psychological trick enhances the legitimacy of the judicial decision).
77. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 560 (1982).
Because of its generality, the concept of equality alone does not answer legal questions. /d. at 551.
78. Sartorius, supra note 13, at 172 ("[T)he very notion of justification, judicial or other·
wise, is inseparable from the concept of a good reason for acting in a certain sort of way.").
79. But see Altman, supra note 76, at 328 (arguing that judicial decision making is more
legitimate when judges do not fully understand their decision-making process).
80. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S . Ct. 2791, 2875 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) .
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fectiveness of a method of justification that portrays the decision as
uniquely correct:
As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we
Justices were doing essentially lawyers' work up here-reading
text and discerning our society's traditional understanding of
that text-the public pretty much left us alone. Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about.
But if in reality our process of constitutional adjudication consists primarily of making value judgments[,] . .. then a free and
intelligent people's attitude toward us can be expected to be
(ought to be) quite different. The people know that their value
judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law
school-maybe better.... [If the Court is making value judgments when interpreting the Constitution], then the people
should demonstrate, to protest that we do not implement their
values instead of ours. 81
The contradiction between the rhetoric and the reality of the constitutional decision-making process thus sets up the Casey plurality
for Justice Scalia's attack. Constitutional decision making that involves value judgments is indeed difficult to legitimate according to
the traditional understanding that the Court must draw decisions
from the constitutional text which differ demonstrably from the Justices' preferences. 82 When making value judgments, decision makers
will be strongly tempted to mistake their own preferences for the
law.83 Should they try to look outside their own preferences, they will
find that public views on the values embodied in the Constitution that
are worthy of continuing respect inevitably will differ. 84 Moreover,
even if the public views should reveal some level of consensus, relying
upon this consensus as the basis for constitutional meaning may not
legitimate the Court's efforts to interpret the enduring, rather than
currently popular, constitutional meaning. As Justice Scalia points
out, the presentation of a constitutional decision as the inevitable result of the application of established principles exacerbates these
problems because it obscures what is really going on, thereby potentially allowing judicial fiat to pass for constitutional law. ~
For Justice Scalia and other originalists, the answer to the legitimacy problem lies in the possibility of returning to a constitutional
8

81. !d. at 2884-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 22, at 265 ("[T]he original understanding of the Constitu·
tion is the exclusive source" for principles of constitutional interpretation "that are independent of
the judge's preferences.").
83. Scalia, supra note 45, at 863.
84. ALASOAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6-11 (2d ed. 1984) (detailing how perspectives
on basic moral questions are incommensurable).
85. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J., dissenting)•("(T]he Court does not wish to be
fettered by any ... limitations on its preferences.").
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interpretive process that involves merely "ascertaining an objective
law." 86 Although "value judgments" should not be "dictated,"87 the
Court legitimately can impose analysis of "texts and traditions," because this method of interpretation appropriately constrains the Justices' ability to enact their own preferences into law. 88 Missing from
this analysis, however, is a foundational justification for relying upon
the originalist sources of meaning in the first place. This omission is a
value judgment.89 Thus Justice Scalia, too, makes a political choice
and, with his rhetoric, conceals it.90
But, in explaining a legitimate decision-making process, the plurality perpetuates the illusion of formal legitimacy and thereby
strengthens the originalist critique by paralleling its assumptions. Specifically, by implying that the sources it cites are foundational, the
plurality structures the debate in originalist terms. The question becomes which opinion is most true to the meaning of the presumptively
authoritative and determinant sources. In this type of debate, originalists often will win . Original meaning, according to the particular theory,91 often, although not always, is quite discoverable and determinant.92 Moreover, originalists can claim quite accurately to be better
able to preclude individual decision makers from relying upon personal preferences than can interpretive theorists who do not establish
a hierarchy of particular sources of constitutional meaning. 98 This debate, however, fails to address the initial decision to rely upon an
originalist interpretive method. This value judgment is as controver-

Id. at 2884 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
/d. at 2885 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Bork, supra note 12, at 1-11; Scalia, supra note 45, at 864.
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 285 (1988) (The decision to use the
originalist method of interpretation does not involve "a legal choice, but a moral and political
one."); Earl Maltz, The Miracle at Philadelphia- Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987
UTAH L. REv. 773, 774-75; see also SuNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 104; Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 91 YALE L.J. 1493, 1498-99 (1988).
90. Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices
Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REv. 25, 27 (1994) (demonstrating that Justice Scalia "relie[s] on
something outside the constitutional text to interpret it . . . [which are] political and personal
judgments regarding the proper role of the judiciary").
91. See Michael J . Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REv. 669, 682 ( 1991) (distinguishing sophisticated and unsophisticated
versions of originalism).
92. See Kay, supra note 89, at 236-59; Earl M . Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 43, 50-52 (1987); Perry, supra note 91, at 686 ("The
serious question is not whether the originalist conception can inform the practice of judicial review- it can- but whether it should inform the practice."). But see H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (questioning whether,
even if it is findable and determinant, the framers intended original intent to control constitutional
interpretation).
93. See Scalia, supra note 45, at 864 ("Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system [which is the inevitable tendency of judges to think that the law is what they
would like it to be], for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from
the preferences of the judge himself.").
86.
87.
88.
89.
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sial as the value judgments which the Court makes when engaged in
nonoriginalist interpretation.9 " But a method of portraying the constitutional decision-making process that assumes the foundational authority of these sources obscures the need to justify them.
If the decision in Casey were the only example of the contradiction between the rhetoric of the Court's opinions and its necessary
decision-making process, the prediction of a growing threat to its interpretive legitimacy might be premature. Casey is not, however, an
anomaly in this respect. Instead, the contradiction pervades and
threatens the legitimacy of the Court's entire constitutional jurisprudence-the more controversial the case, the more obvious the contradiction and, thus, the more acute the threat to the Court's legitimacy.
I will briefly discuss another recent example. 911
Perhaps no area of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence is in
greater disarray than its interpretation of the Religion Clauses.
Within this broad category, its decisions regarding public sponsorship
of religious displays are particularly controversial. The Court's most
recent decision in this area, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 96 exhibits
the contradiction between formalist assumptions in presentation and
the inevitable value judgments in the decisional process.
The issue in County of Allegheny concerned two holiday displays, one including a creche and the other including a menorah. The
creche was surrounded by poinsettias and was located on the grand
staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse in downtown Pittsburgh. The menorah was located outside the city-county building, also
in downtown Pittsburgh, along with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. The ACLU alleged that both displays violated the First
Amendment Establishment Clause. 97 In opinions widely criticized as
incoherent, various combinations of Justices held the creche display
unconstitutional and the menorah display constitutional.
In resolving the issues presented in County of Allegheny, all of
the Justices start from the premise that the Establishment Clause
guarantees religious liberty. 98 They also agree that the government
safeguards religious liberty by being "neutral" toward religious be-

94. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 101 ("Acceptance of [the] view [that the original
understanding is binding] itself rests on a controversial moral foundation.").
95. I use these two areas of the Court's jurisprudence as examples only. Other areas suffer
from the same legitimacy problem. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw Ill (2d ed. 1988) ("The aspect of the Court's standing jurisprudence most open to criticism,
... is less the underlying view of the role of the federal j udiciary this new jurisprudence embodies,
than the Court's lack of candor in articulating and justifying the basic choice it has made.").
96. 492 u.s. 573 (1988).
97. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .").
98. 492 U.S. at 590; id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 652 n.ll (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 660 (Kennedy, J ., cbncurring in part and dissenting in part).

378

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1995

lief. 99 The Justices disagree, however, as to how the government
achieves the constitutionally required neutrality in the context of the
displays of religious symbols on government property. 100 The Court
has been struggling for quite a while to identify an alternative to the
traditional Lemon v. Kurtzman three-part test for determining an Establishment Clause violation. 101 County of Allegheny considers only
one prong of the test, whether the "principal or primary effect" of the
holiday displays was "one that neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] religion. " 102 The Justices in the majority and the dissent adopt two different standards to determine whether the displays had this unconstitutional effect.
The majority of Justices apply an endorsement test requiring that
the government not endorse, i.e., "favor," "prefer," or "promote" religious beliefs. 103 This test "captures the essential command of the Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political
community by conveying a message 'that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.' " 10" According to the majority,
the endorsement test is consistent with previous Court decisions, 106 although those decisions mention it only erratically. 106 The test also follows from the "history and tradition of religious diversity ... that is
our national heritage." 107 Although the test is consistent with the historical meaning of the Establishment Clause, government practices at
the time of its creation do .not conclusively determine its modern
meaning. 108 The words of the Establishment Clause must be interpreted according to their recognized meaning "today," not as they

99. /d. at 590-94; id. at 627 (O'Connor, 1., concurring); id. at 644 (Brennan, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 655-59, 664, 675-76 (Kennedy, 1., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
100. See infra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
101. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). A government action that arguably aids religion does not violate
the Establishment Clause so long as it: (I) has a secular purpose; (2) has a principal or primary
effect that does not advance or inhibit religion; and (3) does not give rise to an excessive entanglement between government and religion. /d. at 612-13; see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S.
Ct. 2481, 2487 (not relying on the Lemon test); id. at 2495 (O'Connor, 1., concurring) (suggesting
alternatives to the Lemon test); id. at 2505 (Scalia, 1., dissenting) (criticizing the Lemon test).
I 02. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
103. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593.
104. /d. at 627 (O'Connor, 1., concurring).
105. /d. at 591-97; id. at 623-28 (O'Connor, 1., concurring).
106. For pre-Allegheny majority opinions mentioning the endorsement test, see Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, 1., concurring) (first mentioning the endorsement
test); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1985); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct.
2356, 2371 -72 (1990); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 {1987).
107. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589; see also id. at 646-50 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the history of the Establishment Clause supports "a
strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public property").
108. /d. at 590, 603, 605 & n.55; id. at 630 (O'Connor, 1., concurring); id. at 649 (Stevens,
1., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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may have been understood "in the early days of the Republic." 109
Thus, "[h]istorical acceptance of a practice does not in itself validate
that practice under the Establishment Clause if the practice violates
the values protected by that Clause."110
Rather than using the majority's endorsement test, Justice Kennedy, joined by three other Justices,m would invalidate government
actions only if they "coerce[d] anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise. " 112 Under this test, the government coerces
religious belief when it "in the form of taxation ... suppl[ies] the
substantial benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, direct[ly compels] observance, or . . . exhort[s] to religiosity [in a way]
that amounts in fact to proselytizing."113 In particular, "[s]ymbolic
recognition ... of religious faith" by the government only violates the
Establishment Clause if it "benefits religion in a way more direct and
more substantial than practices that are accepted in our national heritage."114 According to Justice Kennedy, this coercion test, rather than
the endorsement test, is consistent with previous Court decisions, 1111
although certain statements in prior decisions suggesting otherwise
should not be read with "formalism" or "[t]aken to [their] logical
extreme."118 This test is also consistent with the Establishment
Clause's "ultimate constitutional objective as illuminated by history."117 Yet history, viewed strictly as government practices generally
accepted at the time that the First Amendment was ratified, is not
binding. 118 Rather, the meaning of the Establishment Clause must be
interpreted in light of the relationship between the government and
the people "[i]n this century."119 Consequently, the modern coercion
test permits government practices, such as "displays commemorating
religious holidays," even though they were not commonplace in 1791
if they "have no greater potential for an establishment of religion"
than "practices two centuries old. " 120

109. Id. at 590.
110. /d. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Ill. These are Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia.
112. 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) .
113. /d. at 659-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. /d. at 661-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. /d. at 666-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
116. /d. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. /d. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670-71 (1970)).
118. /d. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he relevance
of history is not confined to the inquiry into whether the challenged practice itself is a part of our
accepted traditions dating back to the Founding.") .
119. /d. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissentin'g in part) .
120. /d. at 669-70 (Kennedy, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

380

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 1995

The proponents of both the endorsement and coercion tests thus
offer principled justifications. Both sides appeal to history121 and precedent122 to support their preferred tests. Yet, in interpreting the history, both sides acknowledge that practices at the time that the religion clauses were created do not bind current constitutional
meaning. 12s Rather, the Justices must choose the relevant historical
practices and determine their significance as to the modern meaning
of religious liberty. 124 The same precedent, of course, is cited by one
side and distinguished by the other. 1211 The County of Allegheny decision thus reveals the task of defining the "neutrality" demanded by
the Establishment Clause to be the nonneutral one of giving meaning
to an indeterminate text.
The substance of the justifications offered by the various opinions
therefore makes obvious that the choice of constitutional meaning depends upon value judgments, about which perspectives will differ. Although the Justices at several points acknowledge that they must
"choose" a test to determine constitutional meaning, 126 their portrayal
in their opinions of their decision-making processes and results is rigidly formalistic. Both Justices Blackmun and Kennedy base their conclusions on "settled law." 127
According to Justice Blackmun, Justice Kennedy's view represents "a failure to recognize [a] bedrock Establishment Clause principle,"128 and "transparently lacks a principled basis, consistent with ..
. precedent[]." 129 Justice Kennedy's claim that the majority's interpretation of the Establishment Clause evidences a "callous indifference" to the role of religion in public life is "[far] from the truth,"
"offensive," and "absurd." 130 In fact, "[n]o misperception could be
121. !d. at 589-90; id. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 646-49 (Stevens, J .,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 655-59, 669 (Kennedy, J ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
122. /d. at 591-97; id. at 623-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 655-58, 668-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. /d. at 590, 603, 605 & n.55; id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 649 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
124. /d. at 630 (O'Connor, J ., concurring) (noting that the long-standing existence of practices may make it less likely that the practices convey an endorsement of religion, but also noting
that "historical acceptance of a practice does not in itself validate that practice under the Establishment Clause if the practice violates the values protected by that Clause."); id. at 671 & n.8
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing presidential Thanksgiving Day
proclamations as evidence of a relevant tradition, but noting that Thomas Jefferson declined to
follow this tradition due to his strict views of the degree of separation mandated by the Establishment Clause).
125. /d. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Ly nch
and Marsh); id. at 602-03 (Blackmun, J., distinguishing them).
126. /d. at 609; id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) .
127. /d. at 590; id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. ld. at 605.
129. /d. at 610 n.57.
130. !d. at 610.
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more antithetical to the values embodied in the Establishment
Clause."131 Rather, it is "incontrovertible that the Court's decision ..
. represent[s] ... the respect for religious diversity that the Constitution requires. " 132
Similarly, Justice Kennedy finds the majority's reasoning "quite
confusing," 133 and marvels at "the depth of its error." 13" Its adoption
of the endorsement test is "troubling," and its result, "bizarre."1311
The majority "disregard[s] precedent and historical fact," 136 and
"lends its assistance to an Orwellian rewriting of history." 137 Its approach "contradicts important values embodied in the [Establishment] Clause." 138 The view consistent "with our history and our
precedents" 139 is that the decisions of a local government to permit
the holiday displays at issue represent "matters of taste" over which
the "written Constitution" gives the Court "no jurisdiction."Ho
Justice Scalia does not participate in the decision in County of
Allegheny and, therefore, is not available to provide caustic commentary detailing the inconsistency between the formalist rhetoric of the
opinions and the value judgments upon which the constitutional meanings necessarily rely. 1 " 1 Nevertheless, the many opinions in County of
Allegheny reveal, without the need for explicit commentary, that principled justification can be offered in support of a number of different
constitutional meanings. This recognition dissipates the justificatory
power of the rhetoric. As in Casey, once it becomes clear that the
decision making in fact involves value judgments that the Court cannot justify solely by reference to the text and precedent, then efforts
to do so appear naive or duplicitous. Because the formal justification
starts after the Court has made its value choices, the reasons it offers
do not explain the choices in a way that could possibly legitimate
them.H 2 The opinions devolve to a shouting match, and efforts to offer
a "principled justification" for the constitutional interpretation start

131. ld.
132. /d. at 613.
133. /d. at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. ld. at 668 n.6 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) .
135. ld. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. ld. at 674 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. /d. at 678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Jd. at 677 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139. ld. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. /d. at 679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Such commentary from other Establishment Clause decisions in which Justice Scalia
dissented helps fill the gap. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, I 14 S. Ct. 2481, 2506 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Once this Court has abandoned text and history as guides, nothing prevents it from calling religious toleration the establishment of religion.").
142. See David Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CAL. L. REv. 178, 182
(1984) ("Th{e] availability of [reasonable, respectable] legal arguments on both sides [of hard
cases] means that the relevant point of law can be decided, if at all, only by nondeductive arguments which take conflicting considerations into account.").
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to look exactly like what they cannot legitimately be-naked exercises
of judicial power and impositions of judicial preferences. 148
In sum, the Court's continued adherence to formalism in the
presentation of its constitutional decisions subverts the legitimacy that
it tries to maintain. The Court appears disingenuous or naive by
claiming not to do what it obviously must. Justice Scalia, an eloquent
spokesperson for an originalist interpretive method who quite accurately identifies and criticizes the Court's inconsistencies, aids in this
appearance. Perhaps most important, by failing to acknowledge its
value choices, the Court also has failed to begin the work of trying to
justify sources of meaning as other than undisputedly authoritative. In
a nation "dedicated to the rule of law," 14" but without such foundational sources of meaning, the time to begin the work of defining and
following the path of an alternate legitimacy has arrived.
III.

COMPONENTS OF A NEW LEGITIMACY

If, as I argue, the crux of the Court's legitimacy problem stems
from the widening chasm between what it claims it is doing in interpreting the Constitution and what it realistically can be doing, then
the cure would appear to be to close the gap by harmonizing the
Court's manner of presenting its decisions with its actual decisionmaking process. Specifically, the Court could acknowledge the value
choices that it makes and explain the actual underlying reasons. 1411
Why doesn't the Court do this? I suspect the Court has several
reasons for its continued adherence to what I view as an outdated and
counterproductive mode of presenting its decisions. One reason is simple force of habit. Changing a method of presentation that has become ingrained in the very idea of what a judicial opinion should be is
indeed difficult. A second reason supports the force-of-habit explana:
tion with the if-it's-not-broken-don't-fix-it rationale. My purpose in
Part II was to demonstrate that the formal mode of presentation is
defective, and that its inadequacies are becoming increasingly obvious.
143. Others have ·noted that legal language of objectivity and neutrality can disguise what is
actJlally a naked imposition of preferences that are not universal. For critical legal scholars making this point, see, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1731-37; Tushnet, supra note 36, at 804-24;
Unger, supra note 13, at 655-60. For feminist legal theorists, see, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 877 (!990); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking
Women's Silence in lAw: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE ·
DAME L. REv. 886 (1989); Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 38-45.
For critical race theorists, see, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and
Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1611 (1988); Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider
Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 741, 748 (!993).
144. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992) (plurality).
145. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 20; Robert A. Leftar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw.
U. L. REv. 721 (1979); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731
(1987); Singer, supra note 13.
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To me, the shrill tones of the Court's most controversial constitutional
decisions indicate that the Justices themselves are aware of this growing problem. In fact, I suspect that the Court's continued adherence
to a formal mode of presentation stems not so much from the perceived efficacy of the presentation as from the failure to perceive alternate manners of presentation that could create the perception of
legitimacy. That is, if the only alternative to formal legitimacy is the
abyss of relativism, 148 perhaps it is better to perpetuate the illusion of
formal legitimacy for as long as possible. 147
Like the Court, I am not sure an alternative to formal legitimacy
exists. I am more sure, however, that formal legitimacy does not work.
It is on that commitment, therefore, that I believe it appropriate to
act. We need to define a legitimacy that does not depend upon indisputable foundational sources of constitutional meaning. The Court
can play a role in doing this. In this Part, I offer components of a
· revised understanding of legitimacy, which, if displayed in a judicial
opinion, could help demonstrate the crucial components of legitimacy-that the decision reflects law rather than the personal preferences of the decision makers, and that the content of that law is worthy of public respect:
A.

Principled Decision Making

"[P]rincipled justification," according to the Court, is the essence
of the "judicial act." 148 A "principled decision" is "one that rests on
reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved." 149 Thus, principles are a particular type of reason that have
been, and continue to be, viewed as crucial to establishing the legitimacy of the Court's constitutional interpretations. 1 &0
I will offer here the classic understanding-apparent, I believe, in
the Court's opinions-of how reliance upon principles in constitutional
146. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 40, at 741 (describing a "new nihilism" that holds that "for
any text-particularly such a comprehensive text as the Constitution-there are any number of
possible meanings, that interpretation consists of choosing one of those meanings, and that in this
selection process the judge will inevitably express his own values"); Morris R. Cohen, On Absolutism in Legal Thought, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 681, 699 (1936) (criticizing "a nihilistic absolutism
according to which there can be 'no logical certainty in the law at all.").
147. Joseph Vining, Legal Affinities, 23 GA. L. REv. 1035, 1049 (1989) ("Law must at least
be aware of the possible value of illusion, the possible necessity of it.").
148. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992).
149. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 19.
150. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 8, at 23-28; BORK, supra note 22, at 143-60; RONALD
DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 411 (1986) ("We should ... try to conceive our political community as
an association of principle ... [because] that conception of community offers an attractive basis
for claims of political legitimacy in a community of free and independent people who disagree
about political morality and wisdom."); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 200 (1961).
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interpretation establishes the core elements of its legitimacy. Most
fundamentally, principles constrain the judicial decision so that the
decision maker does not act as "a naked power organ." 1111 The discipline of locating and relying upon principles removes personal bias as
much as possible from the decision-making process.1112 It also helps
decision makers screen out other extraneous influences that may dictate particular results but may not be consonant with enduring principles.1113 Articulated principles help harmonize decisions with each
other. 1114 This harmony lends coherence and predictability to the law.
These traits, in turn, help demonstrate the enduring, rather than the
case specific, nature of the grounding of constitutional decisions. 11111 In
addition, the requirement that the decision maker provide such an articulation actually may change the process, as the decision maker may
discover that a certain desired result "simply 'won't write.' " 1118 The
exercise of providing reasons thus may serve as an important constraint on the decision-making process.1117
Principles support not only the substance but also the perception
of legitimacy. By stating the principles upon which it relied, the decision maker demonstrates the substance.1118 The content of the principles offered should engender respect. 1119 Moreover, the very act of providing them may engender respect as well by treating the losing
litigants and the public at large as deserving of an explanation.18° Finally, the act of stating principles in judicial opinions facilitates communication among constitutional decision makers. 181 The apparent
continuity of these principles can demonstrate an accumulated wis151. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 12.
152. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 CoLUM. L.
R EV. 982, 998 (1978) .
153. In addition to purely personal preferences, judges ma y be influenced by interest
groups, the values of their social or economic class, see BoRK, supra note 22, at 8; ELY, supra
note 42, at 58-59; or perhaps by the impulse to bend over backwa rds so as not to act upon their
personal preferences.
154. Greenawalt, supra note 152, at 998.
155. See, e.g., id. at 1000; Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79
VA. L. REv. 583, 619 ( 1993) ("[P]rinciples function to endow constitutional provisions with a
wisdom that transcends that of either their flesh-and-blood authors or their mortal interpreters.");
Wechsler, supra note 12, at 12 (criticizing " ad hoc evaluation").
156. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A J UDGE 57 (1980) ("The act of writing te11s US
what was wrong with the act of thinking."); see J. Clark Kelso, A R eport on the California
Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L. J . 43 3, 487 (1994) (" [W]riting an opinion . . . helps to ensure
the . . . initial decision withstands the disciplined rigor of a written memorializa tion.").
157. GOLDING, supra note 47, at 9 ("[R]easons ... opera te as controls on the process of
deliberation.") .
158. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 365-72
(1978); Levi, supra note 19, at 409.
159. GoLDING, supra note 47, at 9 ("The reasons [which the Court offers in a n opinion]
will have to be regarded by [the audience] as good reasons for the decision.").
160. /d. a t 8 (" In making an effort at rational persuasion, judges show respect for their
a udience by addressing its members as rational individuals .. . .").
161. Greenawalt, supra note 152, at 998 ("[T]he technique of posing cases a nd suggesting
principles orally and in draft opinions is a crucial method of communication among judges . . . .").
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dom, which in turn helps to show that the decision is independent of
purely personal preferences and worthy of respect.
Pursuant to this understanding, "[t]he virtue or demerit of a
judgment turns ... entirely on the reasons that support it and their
adequacy to maintain any choice of values it decrees . . . . " 162 The
problem, however, with the use of such "neutral principles" as the
sole determinant of constitutional interpretive legitimacy is that the
neutrality upon which the validity of the principles depends is impossible to achieve. 163 That is, principles do not dictate value choices. The
actuality is vice versa. 164 Thus "principles" cannot serve the ultimate
justificatory function as traditionally envisioned. 1611
The question is whether principles can still serve some important
function with respect to creating legitimacy even if they alone are not
sufficient to sustain it. I think they can. 166 That principles cannot provide ultimate justification does not mean that they can provide none at
all. 167 A new understanding of legitimacy must be based upon real
possibilities. Achieving some of the qualities that principles have been
thought to provide is better than achieving none. That reliance upon
principles to establish interpretive legitimacy may require supplementation does not mean that constitutional decision makers should abandon them altogether.
One way in which the effort to rely on principles can still help
constitutional decision makers is by screening out personal and other
partisan biases. The discipline of finding and enunciating principles
that transcend particular cases can make at least some constitutional
meanings wildly implausible.168
Thinking in terms of principles also can help decision makers to
remember the goal of articulating constitutional meanings that not
only stem from the past, but also will endure into the future. In turn,

162. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 19-20.
163. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 36, at 822 ("[N]eutral principles theory proves unable
to satisfy its demand for rule-guided judicial decisionmaking in a way that can constrain or define
the judicial institution . . . .").
164. See. e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 103 ("Those who deny the existence of [moral
decisions external to the Constitution] are without self-consciousness."); see also TAYLOR, supra
note 21 , at 99 ("It is a form of self-delusion to think that we do not speak from a moral orientation which we take to be right.").
165. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 401 (Such justification requires an " antecedent morality," which supplies a "common vocabulary in terms of which critics can argue with one another
about how well this task [of constitutional interpretation] has been performed.") (quoting Richard
Rorty, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism, in CONSEQUENCES OF
PRAGMATISM 139 (1982)).
166. I am not alone in this belief. See Greenawalt, supra note 152, at 1001 ("I do not
believe any critic denies that at least one thing for which courts should strive is principled justifi'
cation . . . .").
167. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Letter, Determinancy, Objectivity and Authority,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 589 (1993) ("Uniqueness . . . is not a requirement of legitimate
authority.").
168. See. e.g., Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 13.
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displaying the principles in the judicial opinion can move toward establishing that the constitutional decision-making process is substantively legitimate. And, most basically, the act of trying to articulate
principles for constitutional decision making is more likely to engender respect than unexplained pronouncement. 189
Finally, we have, after all, grown accustomed to principled decision making as the mark of constitutional interpretive legitimacy.
Even if principles are largely indeterminant, their invocation still
seems to command some respect, which is an aspect of legitimacy. I
say, let principles continue to work what magic they can. 170 At the
same time, we should begin constructing a foundation under the invocation of principles, so that when they become obviously empty of justificatory power, something else supports the decision's legitimacy. In
the remaining subparts, I discuss additional components of legitimacy
that can supplement the invocation of principles.
B.

Articulacy

A demonstrated reliance upon principles, as I have argued, can
help establish the core elements of interpretive legitimacy both because these principles help constrain constitutional decision makers
from writing their own preferences into the law and because they can
engender public respect. Using principles in establishing constitutional
interpretive legitimacy is of limited value, however, because they are
often so general that they support a number of different constitutional
meanings 171 and thus may not truly explain the meaning that the
Court has chosen. Although the Court in its explanations purports to
use broad principles to derive specific meanings, the reality is vice
versa: the broad principles which the Court articulates already contain choices about more specific meanings that the Court fails to justify. Absent .an explanation that addresses the controversial choices
made by the Cqurt, its chosen constitutional meanings · appear to be
judicial fiat. 172 This appearance undercuts the Court's. interpretive legitimacy. What is necessary, therefore, is an explanation t~af precedes principles and that can help demonstrate that the chosen constitutional meaning differs from the decision makers' personal
preferences and, thus, is worthy of respect.
169.' ·See, e.g.; SUNSTE~N. supra notel4, at 126 ("[A]ny position about law and politics, to
be worth holding, must be justified with reference to reasons.").
170. See Smith, supra note 155, at 619-25 (describing the invocation of principles as a step
in constitu tiona! idolatry).
171. See, e.g., Schauer, Formalism, supra note 13, at 514; Tushnet, supra note 36, at 822
(When following a "principle . .. we can justify a tremendous range of divergent answers by
constructing the rule so that it generates the answer that we want.") .
172. S ee, e.g., Feldman, supra note 36, at 704 (noting the problem where "Justices inevitably seem to impose their perso.nal values on society").
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This phenomenon of unarticulated understandings in constitutional adjudication represents, I believe, a more specific instance of
the dilemma, apparent in public discussions generally, that people
hold different moral commitments which they deem to be fundamental and from which they reason to judgments on particular issues.·
These different underlying premises lead to different specific results.
Our problem is that we have not found a way to mediate meaningfully
among the basic prernises. 173 Absent some sort ofjudgment and a justification for that judgment at the most basic level of discussion, justifications offered further up the chain of logic are unconvincing.
Take, for example, the raging public debate over whether the law
should permit abortion: Views on this issue generally stem from judgments about the relative value of fetal life and a woman's bodily autonomy. These judgments may have religious, philosophical, pragmatic, or other roots. Adherence to these judgments, however, is not a
matter of logic, but a matter of faith or emotional embrace. 174 Logic
cannot mediate among these rival premises. Hence, efforts at justification that define these nonlogical judgments as their starting points begin their reasoning after points of view have already diverged. When
the discussions begin at this level, rational reconciliation of the competing positions seems only a faint possibility. 1711
The Court's discussions of the constitutional protection of the
abortion decision suffer the same fate. "At the heart [of the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment]," explains the, Casey joint
opinion, "is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 176 This
premise competes with the premise "that what the Court calls the
fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life." 177 For
those who subscribe to the latter premise, the constitutional meaning
derived by logical reasoning from the former "is bound to be
wrong." 178 Thus, those who do not agree with the former premise will
remain unconvinced by a judicial opinion based upon it.
These rival, and apparently incommensurable, 179 premises that
guide judicial and public argumentation are not, however, without

173. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 84, at 253 ("[M]odern politics cannot be a matter
·of genuine moral consensus."); Levinson, supra note 5, at 401 (disputing the view that "morality
remains widely shared and available to reflection").
174. See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech Theory, 68
TuL. L. REv. 1563, 1569 (1994) (noting a link between emotion, value judgments, and choice).
175. See MACINTYRE, supra note 84, at 6-11 (detailing rival positions on the morality of
abortion and noting the incommensurability of their underlying premises) .
176. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (plurality).
177. !d. at 2875 (Scalia, J., dissenting) .
178. !d. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. See MACINTYRE, supra note 84, at 8 (defining incommensurability as existing when
"the rival premises are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the claims of one as
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foundation. The Court has moved away from reliance upon foundational sources of meaning because some more contingent sources of
meaning guide them. Indeed, such contingent sources of meaning inform the competing premises from which adherents to different points
of view on abortion reason. These sources are difficult, but not impossible, to identify.180 Nor do these premises stand alone. Rather, each
is connected to a moral vision that, in fact, establishes the existence of
the premises. The premises themselves make sense only in light of this
moral vision. That is, the moral vision more specifically explains the
meaning of the premise and why the premise is worth affirming. 181
The vision thereby helps justify conclusions to which the premise
leads. This type of articulacy about the sources and moral visions informing constitutional decisions is the Court's best hope of justifying
its authority when the principles upon which it ostensibly relies are
hotly disputed.
I adapt my meaning of articulacy in constitutional interpretation
from Charles Taylor's recent philosophical discussion. 182 Articulacy
means putting the vision of the good that informs the particular judgment into words.183 Such articulacy is necessary for the judgment to
convey its meaning because "the good is what, in its articulation, gives
the point of the rules which define the right." 18" That is, we all "speak
from a moral orientation which we take to be right." 18& We, by and
large, assume, however, the grounding for this moral orientation
rather than state it directly. But, without articulating the sources of
these moral orientations, we cannot examine, discuss or even affirm
them. Thus, moral disagreements are in fact intractable because no
discussion occurs at the point where the moral commitments diverge.
Articulacy represents "the attempt to articulate the good" that informs the moral principles that, in turn, lead to judgments on particular issues. 186

against another."); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF fREEDOM 321 -66 (1986) (also defining incommensurability).
180. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 84, at 6-11 ( tracing various positions on the morality of abortion to ideas articulated by various philosophers).
181. See TAYLOR. supra note 21, at 77. Taylor explains:
It is one thing to say that I ought to refrain from manipulating your emotions or threatening
you, because that is what respecting your rights as a human being requires. It is quite an·
other to set out just what makes human beings worthy of commanding our respect, and to
describe the higher mode of life and feeling which is involved in recognizing this.

!d.
182. See TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 53-107 (discussing the "ethics of inarticulacy" and
"the point of articulacy about the good").
183. /d. at 103 (arguing for " the attempt to articulate the good in some kind of philosophi·
cal prose") .
184. /d. at 89.
185. ld. at 99.
186. /d. at 103.
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Specifically, "articulating a vision of the good" differs from "offering a basic reason" 187 because reasons already contain assumptions
about the good. 188 Thus, discussions that start with reasons actually
may begin after perspectives have diverged . Articulacy about " what
underlies our ethical choices, leanings, intuitions" 189 addresses the
point of the divergence. It requires "setting out just what I have a dim
grasp of when I see that A is right, or X is wrong, or Y is valuable
and worth preserving, and the like. It is to articulate the moral point
of our actions." 190 Only at this leveP91 does the articulation have the
possibility of being convincing, "either by articulating what underlies
[the listener's] existing moral intuitions or perhaps by [the] description moving [the listener] to the point of making it [the listener's]
own."I92
Once we recognize that constitutional adjudication requires value
judgments, I think that we need to see that this type of decision making, like moral decision making generally, stems from a vision of the
good. The threat to the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation thus
stems from confusion similar to that which Taylor identifies as plaguing modern philosophy, that proponents of rival interpretations keep
their "most basic insights inarticulate." 193 This "inarticulacy" is a
"crippling handicap to seeing clearly . . . in the very modern predicament of perplexity and conflict between rival notions of the good." 19'
The Court's continued adherence to formalist assumptions in its portrayal of its constitutional decision-making process feeds this
confusion.
Only an effort at articulacy can rescue the Court from its predicament. This requires an effort to identify, explain, and justify as appropriate the sources of value judgments that inform the Court's constitutional decisions and the visions of the good to which they lead. In
Casey, for example, greater articulacy would require a discussion of
why the joint opinion reaffirms a constitutional meaning that protects
the right to terminate a pregnancy. In so doing, the joint opinion privileges a woman's autonomy over fetal life during the first part of a
pregnancy. This judgment stems, in part, from a vision of the good

187. /d. at 77.
188. /d. Assumptions about the good " function a s an orienting sense of what is important,
valuable, or commanding which emerges in our pa rticula te intuitions a bout how we should act,
feel, respond on different occasions, and on which we dra w when we deliberate about ethical
matters." /d.
189. ld.
190. /d.
191. Taylor claims that articulacy about the good " isn' t a step to a more basic leva!, because there is no asymmetry." /d. I use this terminology, however, because I find it most descriptive of what needs to be done-articulate what comes before the articulation of a reason.
192. /d.
193. /d. at 89.
194. ld. at 98.
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that requires this right. The Court needs to explain the value of providing this right. References to "liberty" and "bodily integrity" are
not enough, as competing visions of these concepts are at stake. The
Court needs to provide a vision of the good that explains its decision
to narrow those terms in a particular way.
This effort at articulacy, I believe, can address the primary component of the threat to the Court's interpretive legitimacy, which is
that controversial value judgments remain unacknowledged, unexplained and, thus, unconvincing. Of course, nothing guarantees that
such articulacy about sources of values and visions of the good that
lead to constitutional decisions ultimately will be convincing. Certainly it is unlikely to convince all listeners. The same, however, is
true of the current method of making and presenting judicial decisions-some people remain unconvinced. In very controversial cases in
which mere pronouncements of values have become unconvincing, a
deeper explanation of the source of the values at least creates the possibility of convincing those with apparently different perspectives on
constitutional meaning. At a minimum, articulacy makes the visions
of the good upon which the constitutional meanings depend available
for affirmation or persuasion.m I think it quite likely that this increased lucidity can lead to some degree of reconciliation of apparently incommensurable perspectives. 196 This reconciliation, in turn,
could add legitimacy to the constitutional decision. 197
In addition, greater articulacy can enhance the legitimacy of the
judgment, even as to those who remain unconvinced. Most basically,
articulacy grants the legitimacy that comes from honesty, which is the
legitimacy that comes from treating people with respect. 198 Because
articulacy represents not only honesty, but also effort, it could lend
the additional legitimacy of respect that comes from observing a diligent effort to work through a perplexing dilemma. Moreover, articulacy, which requires a fuller explanation of value judgments, creates a
greater possibility of explaining convincingly how the chosen values
differ from the decision maker's personal preferences. This type of explanation, too, may help legitimate the decision even for those who
disagree with the result. 199 Also, articulacy about the vision of the
good that motivates the decision exposes this vision to ongoing critical
review, thereby allowing those who disagree with the decision maker's

195. See id. at 77.
196. Like Taylor, I can offer this only as a "hunch." !d. at 106.
197. See the discussion of the legitimacy that comes from converged perspectives infra part

III.C.
198. See Shapiro, supra note 145, at 736.
199. See GOLDING, supra note 47, at 8 (explaining that the reasons that underlie a decision
may legitimate it for those who disagree by demonstrating that the decision "was not made
arbitrarily").
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articulation of those grounds to question them in the course of interpreting constitutional meaning. 200 Articulacy's implicit assurance that
this type of discussion can continue to occur may add to the legitimacy of the current result.
Like the exercise of finding and stating principles for constitutional decision making, articulacy alone cannot legitimate the Court's
authority. In tandem, however, with the giving of principles, articulacy can enhance the legitimacy of constitutional decision making. Articulacy creates the possibility of explaining, and thereby potentially
legitimating, what, despite the exercise of offering principles, most
often now goes unacknowledged and thus unexplained.

C.

Augmenting Perspectives

Articulacy supplements the act of giving principles for constitutional decision making by adding depth to the explanation. It thus
creates a greater possibility of explaining a constitutional decision in a
way that appears independent of the decision maker's personal preferences and worthy of respect. But articulacy is not enough to demonstrate the legitimacy of a constitutional decision because, as I have
described it thus far, articulacy requires only explanation of the
choice that the Court makes. Although mere explanation of the
Court's choice provides some legitimacy, the mere description lacks
substantitve legitimacy.201 A more complete legitimacy must thus contain another component which can help guide the Court toward
choices that are more likely to be something other than the decision
maker's preferences and, because of this fact, worthy of public
respect.
This additional component of legitimacy is the demonstrated interpersonal validity of the judgment that comes from augmenting perspectives in the decision-making process. 202 I derive this additional
component from the aspiration that formal legitimacy cannot
achieve-a universally acknowledged foundation to underlie judicial
reasoning. Of course, universally affirmed guides for decision making
are not available. Nevertheless, as with the other components of legitimacy that I have discussed, I do not see why the inability to achieve
legitimacy entirely through this vehicle dictates abandoning altogether
the legitimacy that comes from shared recognitions. Although the as200. Articulacy thus builds elements of the deconstructive method into the decision-making
process itself. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION (1991) (sug$esting this same
possibility in the context of defining "women's interests").
201. See GOLDING, supra note 47, at 3-6 (distinguishing explanatory and justificatory
reasons).
202. See Heidi L. Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1187, 122326 (1994) (noting that interpersonal validity is a component of objectivity).
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piration toward universality appears unachievable, I see as attainable
the more modest goal of identifying or forging partially shared understandings that can help legitimate judgments. Moreover, perhaps the
aspiration for universality does not require unanimous agreement. The
perception that a wide range of perspectives respectfully were included in the decision-making process, and thereby had the opportunity to influence the constitutional meaning that emerged, can also
add to the judgment's legitimacy.
Shared recognitions, I think, are crucial to support the legitimacy
of a constitutional decision. Constitutional decisions, in fact, always
have relied upon them. 203 But this reliance, which has been largely
implicit, now needs to become more overt. To enhance its legitimacy,
the Court must consciously identify and portray in its opinions shared
recognitions that can help support its constitutional meanings. 204
Identifying these shared meanings is best accomplished by an interactive methodology, 2011 which requires the Court to engage actively
with different perspectives on constitutional meaning during the decision-making process. The Court should not choose a constitutional
meaning by other means and then search for agreement. Instead, the
Court should enter the decision-making process willing to listen to,

203. See. e.g., SuNSTEJN, supra note 14, at 103. Sunstein notes:
It is often true that a text has a plain meaning, or that there is no room for interpretive
doubt. But when this is so, it is because there is no disagreement about the appropriate background principles. It is not because there is a preinterpretive 'fact' that people can uncover
without resort to substantive principles.
/d.
204. See Feldman, supra note 202, at 1229, I 253 (noting that convergence on a judgment
suggests its objectivity, which in turn is closely related to the issue of law's legitimacy).
205. Others have called this methodology "dialogue." See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, LovE
AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991) (calling for
ecumenical political dialogue) ; Feldman, supra note 202, at 1223-26 (arguing that a dialogical
methodology best promotes an achievable version of objectivity); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and
Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 653-54 (1993) (arguing that judicial decisions are best
described as the result of dialogue); Michelman, supra note 89, at 1502 (calling for the transformation of constitutional adjudication into a "jurisgenerative dialogue"). Jtirgen Habermas is an
important source of the idea of dialogue as the methodology for legitimate decision making. See
JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975); JORGEN HABERMAS,
MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1990); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHlCAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY (1987) (hereinafter HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE) ; I JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy
trans., 1984) (hereinafter I HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION}. Legitimate decision making,
according to Habermas, should be a conversation among "free and equal members in a cooperative search for truth," Jtirgen Habermas, Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning
"Stage 6", in THE MORAL DOMAIN: EssAYS ON THE ONGOING DISCUSSION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 235 (Thomas E. Wren ed., 1990), and all those whom a judgment
affects should consent to it, Jtirgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra, at 157.
My problem with the terminology stems from my problem with Habermas's theory-both represent an ideal that is so far from what the Court is likely to achieve in the foreseeable future
that I hesitate to use them. By "interactive methodology" I mean to pare down the ideal to represent a conversation where the inclusion and the elimination of power discrepancies is necessarily incomplete.
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and perhaps be persuaded by, different perspectives on constitutional
meaning. 206
How can the Court find these different perspectives on constitutional meaning? Of course, it is impossible, as a practical matter, to
involve the entire public in constitutional decision making. But the
legitimacy that comes from augmenting perspectives need not occur
immediately or be achieved completely to enhance the legitimacy of
the result. The current amicus brief practice provides a vehicle for
starting down the road toward greater participation of previously excluded perspectives in ascertaining the values that underlie constitutional decision making. At this time, the Court infrequently, or at
least erratically, reads or considers these briefs. If the Court were to
consider seriously the perspectives which amicus briefs present, the
level of participation could change, thus potentially presenting a wider
range of perspectives that, if considered and understood, could enhance the intersubjectivity of the result.
Articulacy and an interactive methodology can work together to
make each richer and more complex. Articulacy requires an effort to
put into words the moral vision that underlies particular constitutional
meanings. The combined aspirations toward articulacy and an interactive methodology lead to the aspiration that the Court listen to and
compare different perspectives on constitutional meaning in light of
the visions of the good that they represent.
This complex evaluation of perspectives would enhance the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation in a number of ways . Considering more perspectives in greater depth enhances the possibility of recognizing previously unnoticed commonalities among perspectives. The
demonstrated convergence of perspectives on the constitutional meaning can help demonstrate the core aspects of legitimacy- that the result is based on convergence rather than personal preference and, in
part because of the convergence, is worthy of respect.
In addition to adding the weight of common perspectives to the
result, other reasons to search for previously unrecognized connections
among perspectives can add to legitimacy. 207 One reason is that recognizing connections makes it more likely that participants will find
common ground. Participants may disagree as to the ultimate result,
but agree at various points along the articulacy chain. Articulating
these points of agreement joins the participants, perhaps making their

206. See Ba rtlett, supra note 143, at 881 (A valid decision requires tbat the decision maker
make an " effort to extend [its]limited perspective" by attempting to "identify and understand the
perspectives of others.").
207. On the value of participation in decision making, apart from its results, see HANNAH
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-38 (1958); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 150-55 (1984); PERRY, supra note 205, a t 122-27;
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN. RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHJLOSOPHY 155-70 ( 1980).
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points of disagreement less acrimonious. 208 Another reason to seek various levels of connection among perspectives is that, after ascertaining an underlying moral connection at a general level, the decision
maker must justify a divergence in points of view at a specific level.
Sometimes the divergence will depend upon ascertainable facts that
can dissolve the disagreement.
"Even when we understand them, [however,] some voices will
lose. " 209 This is the inevitability of constitutional decision making-the Court must choose among contested meanings. The "augmenting perspectives" aspect of legitimacy does not dictate how the
Court should do the choosing. Specifically, the requirement that the
Court augment its own perspectives does not dictate that it choose the
majority point of view, or any particular point of view. Rather, the
process should add legitimacy to the result, whatever it may be. An
important aspect of legitimacy is that even the losers respect the judgment, or at least respect the Court's constitutional decision-making
process. 210 The Court's interaction with competing perspectives in the
decision-making process can help create this aspect of legitimacy.
Most fundamentally, legitimacy comes from the honest recognition of difference rather than a subterfuge. As to the public perception
of the decision, "lack of candor seldom goes undetected for long, and
its detection only serves to increase the level of cynicism about the
nature of judging and judges." 211 Honesty about the fact that the
Court can render a constitutional decision in light of differing valid
perspectives on constitutional meaning treats the public as "capable of
dealing with the truth" 212 that value judgments must be made. Those
whose perspectives the decision does not adopt receive the independent
value of being listened to and understood. Honesty as to why the
Court did not adopt their perspective treats them also as capable of
understanding that choices must be made and their perspectives, at

208. Obviously, decreased acrimony will not always be the result of increased articulacy.
Some perspectives contain as their premises intolerance of other points of view. See. e.g., Linda J.
Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing the Message: The Misuse of Cultural Feminist
Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1, 16 (1993) (noting that a
number of the "absolutely held beliefs" of religious fundamentalists "are deeply sexist, racist, and
homophobic") (citation omitted). As to the incompatibility of such views with an interactive
methodology, see Daniel 0. Conckle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment
Clause, 67 IND. L.J. I (1991); David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a
Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IowA L. REv. 1067 (1991).
209. Minow, supra note 143, at 92 (citation omitted); see also MARTHA C. NuSSBAUM, THE
FRAGILITY OF THE Gooo 32-47 {1986); J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction. Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1131, 1167 {1994) ("We have some duty to speak in the language
of the Other, but our duty is not infinite . ... [l)t is not only appropriate but necessary for us to
recognize that the Other's views are incoherent or unjustified, and that our own position is more
reasonable.") .
210. See, e.g., PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW (1984).
211. Shapiro, supra note 145, at 737.
212. /d.
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least this time, were not chosen. Moreover, clarity about the reason
for rejecting the perspective allows these participants to evaluate the
reason and to focus current and future critical review. In addition,
acknowledging that perspectives other than the one chosen can exist
preserves them as a part of the decision-making process in a way that
rejecting them as faulty or not acknowledging them at all does not.
This acknowledgment puts and keeps the perspective in public view
even though it is not chosen, thereby leaving the perspective available
for current and continuing critical review.
Some may argue that such candor in rejecting perspectives damages rather than enhances the legitimacy of the result, because the
explicitness of the explanation may be more hurtful or insulting than
an acknowledged, implicit rejection. This assumption, however, may
minimize the extent to which the implicit rejections are felt already as
hurtful and insulting. The assumption depends to a great extent upon
the ideas that the holders of the rejected perspective do not perceive
the rejections or, perhaps, that they are less likely to blame the decision maker for rejecting their perspective when the decision maker
appears not to recognize what it is doing. Both of these ideas, in turn,
depend upon the illusion that the Court either is not rejecting valid
perspectives on constitutional meaning or does not know that it is doing so. As I have demonstrated, at least in highly controversial cases,
the illusion no longer works. In this type of situation, the illusion does
not legitimate a stance that fails to acknowledge and explain the
choice of perspective and such a stance loses legitimacy because of its
apparent lack of candor or understanding. Although highly controversial cases clearly generate strong feelings, it is much less clear that a
strategy of submerging, rather than addressing honestly, those differences enhances the legitimacy of the necessary choice.
In short, a conscious effort to augment perspectives in the decision-making process can go some of the way toward establishing an
authoritative grounding for constitutional decisions. Although the
Court cannot possibly include all perspectives on constitutional meaning in the decision-making process, it can include some. The efforts
the Court makes toward inclusion will enhance its interpretive legitimacy to that extent. I would be satisfied if the Court would start by
simply addressing respectfully and with an effort toward articulacy
the perspectives embodied in the various concurring and dissenting
opinions offered in any one case. Then, the Court could expand its
discussion to consider perspectives offered in amicus briefs. Finally, in
some cases, the Court might, in fact, request that those with various
perspectives participate in the decision-making process. Any of these
efforts would add to the legitimacy of the constitutional result.
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Honesty

All of the components of legitimacy that I have discussed depend
most basically upon judicial honesty. One might think that the proposition that constitutional decision makers should not deceive their
audiences would need little defense, 213 but apparently it does. 214
Moreover, my idea of judicial honesty goes beyond what critics have
typically identified as the "problem of candor" in judicial decision
making.:m The honesty that I believe is necessary to establish the legitimacy of constitutional decision making indeed requires decision
makers "to search out and disclose the 'deepest' explanation of [their]
actions. " 216 It requires discipline and effort, 217 and represents a
change in how the Court quite obviously views its judicial function. 218
I thus offer a defense of candor in constitutional decision making and
in the portrayal of the decision-making process in the judicial opinion.
In light of the fact that constitutional decision makers must make
controversial value judgments, candor in constitutional decision making means a number of things. Most fundamentally, candor requires
that the decision maker acknowledge the inevitable value judgments
as such. This acknowledgement leads to the additional acknowledgement that, with value choices, no basis for declaring one choice correct and the other incorrect is universally recognized. Thus, honesty
involves the additional acknowledgement that multiple valid perspectives on constitutional meaning may exist. Because of this possibility,
candor requires the decision maker to acknowledge the partiality of its
own perspective. Further, because of the necessary constraints on the
decision maker's ability to augment its narrow perspective, honesty
requires the decision maker to recognize the necessarily limited nature
213. See Altman, supra note 76, at 296-97 (describing it as a "consensus position" within
the legal academy that judges "should become aware of and disclose the real reasons for their
decisions"); Shapiro, supra note 145, at 738 ("[W]ho, after all, would be Grinch-like enough to
argue for lack of [judicial] candor?").
214. See Altman, supra note 76, at 299 (suggesting that "encouraging judges to understand
their decision process better, if effective at all, could be harmful, would proba bly not succeed, and
even if successful might not be worth doing"); Shapiro, supra note 145, at 739 (noting that "the
literature" contains "many eloquent statements of the need for some form of selective deception,
or at least nondisclosure, in the plying of the judge's trade").
215. See Shapiro, supra note 145, at 736 ("[T]he problem of candor ... arises only when
the individual judge writes or supports a statement he does not believe to be so.").
216. /d. at 738 n.33.
217. See. e.g., Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 175, 188 (1986)
("Considering issues from the moral point of view requires habits and attitudes that come from
regular practice."); cf Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See": White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (1993) ("We can work
to make explicit the unacknowledged whiteness of facially neutral criteria of decision ....").
218. See, e.g., Michael W . McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming
Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1536 (1989) (book review) ("[J]udicial decisionmaking contains very little serious deliberation on moral issues." (citation omitted)); Robin West,
Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 715 ( 1990)
("[A]djudication is profoundly elitist, hierarchic, and nonparticipatory.").
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of the ultimate decision. It may be the best decision possible, but it is
not perfect. Thus, honesty requires conforming the presentation of the
decision with what the decision can possibly achieve.
The honesty I advocate would enhance the legitimacy of constitutional decision making in numerous ways. Most fundamentally, acknowledging the value judgments that must occur in constitutional decision making establishes symmetry between the nature of the
decision and its presentation and thereby removes the contradiction
that currently undermines the Court's interpretive legitimacy. Specifically, a Court that is honest about what it is doing in the interpretive
process no longer exposes itself to claims that it is naive or deceptive.
Such honesty also transforms the judicial opinion from a strategic to a
genuinely communicative act. 219 Opinions framed as strategic action
can be expected to evoke similar strategic responses from the public
audience. By contrast, communicative actions treat the recipients as
worthy of respect, rather than as objects to be manipulated. 230 Legitimacy, which comes from respect for the decision maker and the decision-making process, would seem to require this type of honesty as a
basic prerequisite.
Moreover, in contrast to a formal mode of presentation, attempting through articulacy to examine and explain the value judgments
creates the possibility of legitimating the choice as independent of
personal preferences and worthy of respect. Acknowledging that constitutional decision making requires value choices and exercising articulacy also exposes interpretive methods, such as originalism, which
often presume sources of meaning to be foundational, to require articulate justification as well. 221 Honesty about the nature of the constitutional decision-making process puts all interpretive choices on the
same footing-requiring a demonstration that they meet the demands
of legitimacy. 222

219. Jilrgen Habermas makes this distinction in creating his theoretical model of discourse
ethics. See I HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 205, at 340-43. He first distinguishes two realms of human activity- <me geared toward truth seeking and understanding and
the other geared toward efficient economic production and interaction. He then distinguishes what
he calls strategic action from communicative action. Communicative action is oriented toward
understanding, whereas strategic action is meant to obtain the goals of the speaker through means
other than understanding, including dishonesty and manipulation. HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL
DISCOURSE, supra note 205, at 355. Only communicative action can be the basis for a legitimate
decision, for otherwise the decision will be the result of the exercise of power rather than mutual
understanding and agreement.
220. See HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE, supra note 205, at 355; see also Shapiro,
supra note 145, at 736 ("[T]he case for honesty in all human relations .. . rests in part on the
importance of treating others with respect.") .
221. See, e.g. , SuNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 101 ("[The underpinnings of originalism] need
to be defended . .. [and) would have to be based on something other than history.").
222 . See, e.g., DwoRKIN, supra note 150, at 260 (acknowledging that there are no "politically neutral interpretive convictions") ; PERRY, supra note 205, at 132 ("Whether to pursue a
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Another aspect of honesty in judicial opinion writing is acknowledging the necessary limitations of any judgment reached. 223 Constitutional decision makers are human, and they have limited capacities
to meet the demands of legitimacy.:m Decision makers may attempt
to expose and examine the sources of their value judgments, but this
task is potentially endless, and ultimately requires a transcendence of
individuality that probably is not achievable. 226 Decision makers also
can attempt to portray their decision-making process and its result in
a way that the public will deem worthy of respect. As we know,
though, it is impossible to please everyone. Thus, respect, like independence of personal preferences, must come in degrees.
Given these recognitions, judicial honesty includes the additional
recognition of the imperfect nature of legitimacy itself. Decision makers can only try to make the best choices under the circumstances that
currently exist. This is not to say that constitutional decision makers
should not strive to articulate enduring constitutional meanings.
Rather, their efforts to do so will be limited by their situations. Honesty in a judicial opinion requires that the decision maker acknowledge this. By doing so, the decision maker limits the definition of legitimacy toward which it strives. Because the definition is more
limited, it is more achievable. Thus, by acknowledging the necessary
partiality of any chosen constitutional meaning, the Court in fact can
enhance, rather than reduce, the legitimacy of its result.
Honesty, as embodied in all of the components of legitimacy that
I have discussed, also adds to the legitimacy of a decision by opening
it to ongoing critical review. This greater openness effectively allows
those who ultimately embrace the substance in part or in whole as
their own to do so.226 Unlike a decision that is unclear about its
sources of meaning, and thus relies for its legitimacy solely on the
articulation of its result, a decision that honestly attempts to portray
its own sources both deeply and as emerging from the interaction of
different perspectives on constitutional meaning creates the possibility
of wider public affirmation. For those who continue to disagree with
the choices made in the constitutional decision, its openness neverthe-

coercive political strategy is a (political-) moral question, of course, and any list of criteria for
answering that question is rooted in a set of moral beliefs.").
223. See. e.g., Catherine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S CAL. L. REv. 1727, 1746
(1990) ("The recognition that legal judgments are situated is the first step towards an authentic
ideal of fairness.").
224. See. e.g., Bartlett, supra note 143, at 881 ("Truth is partial in that the individual
perspectives that yield and judge truth are necessarily incomplete.").
225. See THOMAS NAGEL. THE VIEW fROM NOWHERE 6 (1985) ("(S]ince we are who we
are, we can't get outside of ourselves completely."); Bartlett, supra note 143, at 882 ("I cannot
transcend my perspective; by definition, whatever perspective I currently have limits my view.").
226. See TAYLOR, supra note 21 , at 91 ("[G]oods . . . only exist for us through some
articulation.").
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less provides the promise of ongoing critical review of the result and
its sources.
I know that incorporating this level of honesty in constitutional
opinion writing is risky. 227 Scholars have made various arguments in
support of judicial ignorance228 and benevolent judicial deception. 229
These arguments all generally reduce to the claim that the Court, or
the public, are better off not knowing exactly how the Court reaches
its decision because otherwise the public will lose respect for the process and the Court's decisions will lose legitimacy. 230
These arguments, however, depend upon the success of the deception.231 My discussion of the several examples in part I indicates that
the Justices' opinions in single cases, when read together, dispel the
illusion upon which the legitimacy of any one of them depends. At
least in these very difficult cases where it is quite obvious that value
judgments are being made, the formalist illusion fails. 232 In these circumstances, lack of candor not only does not enhance the perceived
legitimacy of the decision, but when it is detected, breeds cynicism
rather than respect. 283
Because the success of the illusion of formal legitimacy may vary
from case to case, the Court could perhaps experiment in its most
controversial cases with the components of legitimacy that I propose
because, in these cases where the formalist assumption is most untenable, the Court has the least to lose. If, as I believe, displaying these
components in the judicial opinion leads to increased respect for the
process and its results, then the Court could adopt the method on a
227 . See MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1964) ("It
would be fantastic indeed if the Supreme Court, in the name of sound scholarship, were to disavow publicly the myth upon which its power rests."); Altman, supra note 76 (arguing that introspective judicial decision making could lead to less constrained, and therefore less legitimate, decision making); Michael D. Daneker, Moral Reasoning and the Quest for Legitimacy, 43 AM. U. L.
REv. 49, 53 (1993) (Judicial opinions that employ Lawrence Kohlberg's stage-four "law and order" legal reasoning "may confer greater legitimacy on the act of judicial decision making than
other types of moral reasoning" because lawyers are accustomed to it.); see also TAYLOR, supra
note 21, at 107 (noting the risk that "articulacy will buy us much greater inner conflict").
228. See Altman, supra note 76.
229. See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L.
REv. 1191, 1193 (1994) (arguing for a system of "esoteric government, in which the governed are
not fully aware of the nature of the system that governs them") ; Shapiro, supra note 145, at 73850 (addressing five instances in which scholars have argued that judges should not be completely
honest about their decision-making process).
230. See fRANK, supra note 20, at 157 ("[F]ear of legal uncertainty leads to [judicial]
concealment.").
231. See THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 237 ( 1935) ("Folklore which
is frankly recognized by a people to be folklore is from that moment on no longer folklore. ").
232. I happen to think that the deception is obvious not only to those of vs in the scholarly
heights, but also to the public more generally. It is for this reason that I take issue with academic
invocations to judicial deception. See, e.g., Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 229. I think a large
portion of the public sees through judicial efforts to deceive, which makes the benevolence of the
deception insulting.
233. Shapiro, supra note 145, at 737; see also fRANK, supra note 20, at 157 ("[Judicial]
concealment has ... made the labor of judges less effective.").

400

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 1995

wider scale. The whole premise of components of legitimacy, rather
than one complete vision, means that legitimacy comes in increments.
It is entirely possible, therefore, to attempt to achieve these components in degrees instead of in one fell swoop.
The fact that the components of legitimacy can be effective even
if implemented incrementally addresses another criticism of honesty-that the components of legitimacy require a Herculean judicial
effort, impossible for constitutional decision makers actually to
achieve.234 But this criticism appears more devastating to the ideal of
formal legitimacy which judicial opinion writing currently embodies
rather than to the components of legitimacy previously discussed. As I
view it, the ideal of formal legitimacy is all or nothing. Either sources
are foundational or they are not. If they are not, then the chain of
formal judicial reasoning loses its legitimacy.
By contrast, my components of legitimacy help build a grounding
for the constitutional decision that can give it legitimacy. Any judicial
effort toward achieving these components thus adds some legitimacy.
The components' incremental character makes it possible to weigh the
value of achieving each component fully against other values, such as
efficiency or even, in particular cases, the value of deception.u11 The
components are flexible, and, therefore, can bend to accommodate the
real life demands of constitutional adjudication. My point is simply
that, all other things being equal, they can add a legitimacy to constitutional decision making that the assumption of formal legitimacy
cannot. The type of honesty that my components demand in judicial
decision making thus represents an appropriate aspiration.
IV. THE METHOD OF ARTICULATE DECISION MAKING

Part II established the components of a legitimacy that can replace the assumptions of formalism apparent in the Court's constitutional decisions. In this part, I combine these components into a
method called articulate decision making. Articulate decision making
would enhance both the substance and the perception of the Court's
constitutional interpretive legitimacy. As to substance, the explicit
method would guide and impose a discipline on the decision-making
process that would make it more likely that the constitutional meaning would have interpersonal validity and otherwise be worthy of respect. As to perception, the revised substance would allow the Court

234. See, e.g., DwORKIN, supra note 150, at 245 (naming his hypothetical decision maker
Hercules and noting that to accomplish the ideal he would need to have "superhuman talents and
endless time").
235. See Shapiro, supra note 145, at 750 (limiting his defense of judicial candor to account
for "extraordinary occasions" when moral imperatives outweigh the value of truthfulness).
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to replace its aspirations to formalism with an explanation of its decision making more likely to demonstrate these crucial aspects of
legitimacy.
The articulate decision-making process consists of several stages
that necessarily interact. For clarity I will first discuss each of the
steps and then discuss their potential interaction.
A.

The Substance of Articulate Decision Making

The decision-making step of the articulate decision-making procedure involves two stages, one nonevaluative and the other evaluative. It is crucial that the decision maker observe the discipline of both
of these stages because the legitimacy of the second builds upon, and
thus to a great extent depends upon, the success of the first.
1. Nonevaluative Listening
The first step in the articulate decision-making process is the decision maker's true listening to the available perspectives on constitutional meaning. Initially, this step requires that the decision maker
acknowledge all of the perspectives before it as valid as perspectives.236 The decision maker must go through the mental exercise of
acknowledging that the observers' different situations may make the
issue to be decided appear differently to different people. In the process of doing this, the decision maker must also acknowledge the partiality of its own perspective. The effort at this stage must be, to the
greatest extent possible, to try to understand which different situations
led to the different points of view. 237 The understanding sought should
be both logical and emotional. 238 The greater the level of understanding, the greater the legitimacy of the ultimate evaluation as independent of the decision maker's purely personal preferences. 239

236. The feminist practice of consciousness raising employs similar assumptions. See Bartlett, supra note 143, at 863-67.
237. Minow, supra note 143, at 57 ("Before justice can be done, judges need to hear and
understand contrasting points of view.").
238. PERRY, supra note 205, at 98 ("[D]ialogue can be a process through which hearts as
well as minds are changed."); Posner, supra note 2, at 851 ("The proper conception [of interpretation] is knowledge by empathy.").
239. Although it may appear distasteful to acknowledge all proffered perspectives as valid
at any stage in the decision-making process, nothing short of this discipline can ensure that worthy
perspectives are not dismissed without explanation. The decision maker's ackn9wledgement of different perspectives on constitutional meaning and explanation of why some are chosen and some
are not is a crucial aspect of the legitimacy of the evaluation stage. To the extent that some
perspectives are widely viewed as unacceptable, this can serve as the explanation for rejecting
them as appropriate for guiding constitutional decision making. The honesty requirement of articulate decision making demands, however, that they at least be acknowledged and their rejection
explained.
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At a minimum, the Court should read and consider honestly both
the briefs presented to it in any particular case and the perspectives
set forth in concurring and dissenting opinions. To achieve the fullest
possible understanding of the different perspectives on constitutional
meaning presented in a case, the Court should consider not only the
range of different perspectives offered, but also each perspective in
terms of the moral vision that informs it. Thus, when considering apparently conflicting perspectives on constitutional meaning, the decision maker should attempt to understand what causes the difference,
whether it be a divergence in a foundational vision of the good or
some later divergence.
In County of Allegheny, for example, the Court had before it the
briefs of the parties and seven amicus briefs. In addition, the opinion
set forth a number of other perspectives offered by the Justices themselves. An articulate decision in the case would require that the Court
consider all of these perspectives, not only as to result,240 but also as
to underlying moral vision. Because the amicus briefs generally follow
the formal pattern of the Court's opinions, the task of considering the
perspectives in depth would not be easy. The form of the amicus
briefs, however, corresponds to the perception of what constitutes effective advocacy, and a change in the Court's decision-making process
could change both this perception and, consequently, the form of the
briefs. As the method of articulate decision making develops, it would
need to make the participants in the constitutional decision-making
process responsible for presenting their positions according to the requirements of articulacy. 241
In any event, to the extent that the decision maker can trace the
path of other perspectives, this exercise will help the decision maker
understand the particular circumstances that contributed to the perspective, and will give the decision maker insight as to whether the
circumstances should be relevant to public constitutional decision
making. In a case like County of Allegheny, the Court could at least
try to make this effort. Clues to the moral visions that inform these
positions exist. 242 This process of attempting to fully understand the

240. Five of the amicus briefs urged reversal and two urged affirmance. See County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 n. + (1989) (plurality opinion).
241. See supra part III.C.
242. These clues are best found in the preface to each brief, where the party states its
interest in the case, perhaps because this is where the parties feel most free to openly acknowledge
their own points of view. After this statement, the briefs by and large present formal arguments
that history and Supreme Court precedent dictate their chosen result. See. e.g., Amicus Curiae
Brief of Concerned Women for America in Support of Petitioners at I, County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (No. 87-2050) ("The purpose of CWA is to preserve, protect and
promote traditional and Judeo-Christian values .. . ."); Amicus Curiae Brief of the National
Legal Foundation, In Support of Petitioners at I, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
( 1989) (No. 87-2050) (If the displays are prohibited, "a pall of secularism that denies history will
descend upon all of American public life.") .

No.2]

RECREATING LEGITIMACY

403

various proffered perspectives and the reasons for their differences is
crucial to the next step in articulate decision making, the critical examination by the decision makers of the diverse perspectives on the
issue in order to reach a decision.

2.

Evaluating

The very nature of making a decision is that, at some point, the
process must become evaluative. The nonevaluative stage of the articulate decision-making process adds the legitimacy of inclusion to the
decision-making process. The evaluative process, however, must to
some extent exclude perspectives. Moreover, a universally acknowledged normative ground for choosing among different perspectives
does not exist. At this stage, articulate decision making enhances legitimacy by clarifying the manner of excluding perspectives and,
where appropriate, preserving perspectives as valid instead of rejecting
them as invalid.
A decision maker might choose one perspective on constitutional
meaning over others for a number of reasons. A crucial variable is
whether the decision maker rejected the perspective because the decision maker deemed it wrong or for some other reason. Articulate decision making requires the decision maker to acknowledge which fork in
this decision-making process it travels, and a sufficient explanation for
the decision would vary according to the path chosen.
On the one hand, a decision maker may reject a perspective as
invalid. If so, it would need to acknowledge this fact and explain why
the perceptions are faulty. These explanations would relate to the nature of perceiving-the participant does not have all the information,
does not know her own interests, has been unable to critically assimilate different perspectives in evaluating her own, or the values embodied in the perspective are so abhorrent to the community that the decision maker is willing to declare them untrue. 243 Whatever the
particular reason, the decision maker must acknowledge the fact that
it is declaring a perspective to be wrong and, thus, must take responsibility for proclaiming one perspective more true.
This requirement would likely limit the number of times that a
decision maker rejects perspectives as invalid by making the act of
doing so more deliberate. By limiting the extent to which a decision
maker rejects a perspective as invalid, articulate decision making

243. This addresses, for example, the concern that some extremely intolerant perspectives
should not be treated as potentially valid by constitutional decision makers. Articulate decision
making allows for this possibility. It simply requires that the decision maker acknowledge that it is
rejecting a perspective and clearly state why.
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gains legitimacy by preserving more perspectives as potentially valid
even after the ultimate decision is reached.
Even for those whose perspectives are declared invalid, articulate
decision making has greater legitimacy than the current method of
rejecting perspectives on constitutional meaning without explanation,
because these participants would at least receive an explanation as to
why the decision maker declared their perspectives wrong. The act of
giving a candid explanation accords the participants a degree of respect lacking in the current practice of ignoring or dismissing alternate points of view. Moreover, the explanation of why the decision
maker rejected a perspective acknowledges the fact of rejection, and
thereby exposes that fact and the explanation to critical review. The
legitimacy of the Court's decision to reject a· perspective as invalid
comes both from its honesty in doing so and from the public perception that the rejection is worthy of respect. The latter sometimes may
not be accurate, but even if the rejection of the perspective is perceived as wrong, it may be perceived as legitimate nevertheless because the candor of the opinion opens the decision-making process to
ongoing critical review.
As an example here, the opinions of the Justices in County of
Allegheny suffice to make the point. Each opinion declares at least
one other opinion wrong. 24• But does the dispute among the Justices
in County of Allegheny actually relate to the nature of perceiving?
Arguably, the Justices on either side have not been able to assimilate
critically different perspectives in evaluating their own. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court does not display a sensitive recognition of
the impact of prohibiting public displays of traditional religious symbols on those to whom the displays are deeply meaningful. Nor does
Justice Kennedy's opinion evidence a recognition of the significance of
feelings of exclusion on those who view public displays of religious
symbols that are not their own. An adequate explanation for rejecting
either of these opinions as wrong would require acknowledging the
reason for this rejection, and, once acknowledged, would require the
one rejecting the other to demonstrate that his opinion does not suffer
from the same defect. A failure to do so would expose the result to
criticism once issued. This criticism could, in turn, hasten reconsideration of the result. Because I think it would be difficult for the Justices
in County of Allegheny to make such a demonstration, the more probable result of this explicit requirement of explanation is that the opinions would acknowledge that they cannot reject the other perspective

244. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989) (Biackmun, J.) (stating
that the Court's decision is "incontrovertible"); id. at 668 n.6 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (marveling at the depth of the Court's error) .
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as wrong. They would have to accept other perspectives as valid as
perspectives.
If a decision accepts a number of perspectives as valid as perspectives, it nevertheless must choose among them to the extent that they
conflict as to a substantive result. In this type of case, the decision
maker would need to explain in terms other than the nature of perceiving why the decision maker prefers one perspective on constitutional meaning over another. To be convincing (that is, to truly give
reasons) in a hard case, the explanation would have to be tied to the
moral vision that informs it. Further, the decision maker's reasons for
the choice would have to justify sufficiently the result in light of conflicting, but potentially valid, perspectives. Thinking through this process should improve the critical worth of the decision by encouraging
the decision maker to be honest initially about its assumptions and
perspectives.
Requiring articulacy in explaining the basis of a constitutional
decision makes the process of evaluating different perspectives on constitutional meaning more complex, but also potentially more fruitful.
Ideally, in the evaluation process the decision maker should listen to
and compare perspectives both as to specific result and underlying
moral vision. This creates the possibility of many different meshings
and conflicts among perspectives. Perspectives may differ as to theresult in a particular case but agree as to the sources of constitutional
principles, or vice versa, or they may agree and clash at several points
along the line from the moral sources to the more particular result.
An articulate decision maker ideally would evaluate its choices from
the specific decision down to the underlying sources of constitutional
meaning.
For example, the Court's evaluation process in cases that, like
Casey, involve the constitutional protection of the abortion decision
would have to focus on the different moral visions that lead to different specific results. These moral visions quite obviously place different
values on fetal life and a woman's ability to control her body. The
evaluation process would have to address why this is so, and it could
omit neither the necessary evaluation of the nature of human life nor
an acknowledged choice about the attributes that are necessary to be
a member of the constitutional community.
Similarly, in cases involving the constitutional restrictions on the
intersection of government and religion, like County of Allegheny, the
evaluation process would have to focus on religion and its place in the
vision of the good that informs constitutional meaning. To the extent
that the Constitution is said to restrict public displays of religious
symbols, the decision maker would need to consider not only how that
restriction benefits the feelings of religious outsiders, but also why
that benefit is a greater good than the feelings of identification others
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would have were the displays permitted. On the other hand, to the
extent that the Constitution permits public use of religious symbols,
the evaluation would have to be in terms of the good realized thereby
as compared to alternate goods that are necessarily foreclosed.

B.

Creating the Perception of Legitimacy

Of course, every stage in the articulate decision-making process
involves articulation by various participants in various ways. The written opinion, however, is the decision maker's formal articulation to the
public, explaining the discovery and generation of the public values
that inform the constitutional principles that it announces.
Most fundamentally, the decision maker must craft the written
opinion so that it represents a genuine attempt at communicative action between the decision maker and the public. 246 In addition, the
written opinion must display to public view the extent to which the
decision reflects the components of enhanced legitimacy built into the
articulate decision-making process. As to augmented perspectives, the
written decision would set out the range of perspectives considered, 246
The written opinion would also display the evaluation process as explained earlier. Thus, the written decision would actively consider and
evaluate these perspectives, rather than merely mention them.
Moreover, the opinion ideally would display both the specific perspectives on the issue to be decided and their most basic sources. The
evaluation process displayed in the decision therefore would indicate
the many commonalities and differences among perspectives. Further,
in addition to using the method of articulacy to display the extent to
which the constitutional meaning represents augmented perspectives,
the written opinion would present whatever result it reached articulately- that is, couched within the broader moral vision that informs
it. In all of these ways, the presentation of the constitutional decision
would display, to the greatest extent possible, the structure upon
which the particular constitutional meaning depends.
This written opinion requirement obviously would change the appearance of the opinions in cases such as Casey and County of Allegheny. Gone would be the caustic comments about each side's infidelity to constitutional meaning and the lengthy excursions through
history and precedent to justify the chosen meaning. In their place
would be the interactive examination of the values described above
that should inform constitutional meaning. Of course, history and preced~nt might still be quite relevant to constitutional meaning, and
245. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
246. This means that the written opinion should at least acknowledge the existence of the
amicus briefs filed in the case.
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caustic comments may be justified, but both would require explanation. This explanation would need to focus on the choice between
competing conceptions of the good, which then could explain why history, precedent, or caustic comments would apply.
C.

Interaction Between the Substance and Perception of
Legitimacy

An articulate decision serves the important function of honestly
recording the decision's past by displaying to public view what actually happened. Yet the legitimacy enhancing effect of the articulate
decision-making process is more complex. The fact that it must produce an articulate decision as described above will necessarily affect
the earlier decision-making process itself. The requirement of an articulate decision thus serves as the important discipline that ensures
that the decision maker actually engages in the articulate decisionmaking process. The written opinion requirement works together dialectically with the process to result in a written opinion that represents
a synthesis different from what could have been predicted at the start
of the process.
By recording the past, the articulate decision also serves as a vehicle for change in the future decision-making process. Recording the
process that occurred changes the expectations of what the process
will be. Therefore, for example, more participants may decide to enter
the process if it becomes apparent that the decision maker will treat
their perspectives with respect. Greater participation in the constitutional decision-making process could increase its legitimacy by adding
to the range of perspectives included, at least to the extent of being
listened to, and perhaps to the extent of influencing the decision itself.
The more perspectives considered, the greater the potential for the
decision maker to demonstrate that the decision is independent of its
own preferences. To the extent that the decision maker brings those
previously excluded into the constitutional decision-making process by
considering their perspectives, the decision may become more legitimate in the eyes of those individuals or groups.
The display and evaluation of the perspectives considered also
might change the substance of participation. Because of the nature of
legal advocacy, articulate decision making ultimately would place responsibility not only on the decision maker, but also on the participants. Participants in the decision-making process would learn that
they must articulate their perspectives on the particular issue in terms
of its motivating moral vision.
•
Of course, articulating such a perspective first requires determining what the perspective is: those who have not previously been asked
or allowed to articulate their perspectives on an issue may not have
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thought about what their perspectives are. The requirement of articulacy therefore may induce the creation of perspectives by indicating to
previous nonparticipants that their perspectives will be included and
considered, thereby causing these new participants to form a perspective by articulating it. 247
In addition, the process of articulating a perspective can change
it, because articulation can lead to critical self-examination. The
speaker may notice inconsistencies in the perspective when putting it
into words. Once a speaker is asked to acknowledge a perspective as
her own, she may examine it more critically to determine whether it is
hers or rather something she has just accepted unquestioningly. In addition, claiming a perspective as her own requires the speaker to test
the perspective against other perspectives and to choose to retain it.
The crucial task of articulating a perspective thus requires effort on
the part of the speaker. The speaker must identify a perspective as the
speaker's own and take responsibility for it.
The requirement of articulacy within a perspective asks the participant to identify the deeper roots of the more specific perspective.
This requires the participant to identify and acknowledge the personal
and societal influences that lead to the perspective, which differ from
those of others. This requires the participant to trace back the story
that led to the current position. 248 This process, too, may involve critical self-examination as the participant tries to make sense of the perspective and to articulate it in a way that others can understand it.249
In addition, requiring articulacy should cause a participant to compare his perspective with others at various levels, which may lead the
participant to change his perspective. 260 In any event, the process requires the participant to take responsibility for the perspective in a
deeper way than currently is expected. This task, although onerous,
could hone the perspectives on constitutional meaning presented to the
Court, making the Court's efforts to understand and evaluate the perspectives more meaningful.
Thus, an articulate decision may change the expectations about
participation in the constitutional decision-making process. Undergoing the introspection required to present an articulate perspective
may, in turn, change the nature of the perspectives ultimately
presented for review by the decision maker. This change may affect
the ultimate result. In this way, the method of articulate decision

247. See TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 91 ("[G]oods [or perspectives] only exist for us through
some articulation.").
248. /d. at 104 ("[T)he path to articulacy has to be a historical one.'') .
249. PERRY, supra note 205, at 105-12 (noting requirement of intelligibility to participate
in dialogue).
250. Michelman, supra note 89, at 1526 (stipulating that the dialogue he proposes presumes
that some participants will change their perspectives as a result of the dialogue) .
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making could enhance the legitimacy of constitutional decision making on an incremental and continuing basis.
V . CONCLUSION

Like the Constitution, the Court's current method of presenting
its constitutional decisions has a pedigree. 251 But as with the Constitution, the pedigree of the Court's opinion-writing style alone is now
insufficient to sustain it. Rather, the Court's decisions must face the
challenge of modernity-that absolute sources of authority are unavailable. Thus, logical reasoning from the traditional sources of constitutional authority is insufficient to justify, and thereby legitimate,
the result. Moreover, the Court's pretense in its opinions that such
justification suffices exposes it to the potent criticism that it is hiding
and not adequately legitimating the value judgments upon which its
decisions inevitably depend.
The Court must break out of this rut. It must acknowledge in its
decision making its value judgments and attempt to justify them. As I
have demonstrated, such justification is possible, contrary to what I
suspect are the Court's fears. The twin components of articulacy and
augmenting perspectives can supplement the traditional exercise of
giving principles to legitimate constitutional decision making. Articulate decision making combines these components in a method that
would harmonize the rhetoric and the reality of the Court's decisions,
and thereby reestablish the Court's constitutional interpretive legitimacy as we enter the twenty-first century.

251. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 ( 1803) (observing that judicial
review of the constitutionality of legislative acts might not be available is "an absurdity too gross
to be insisted on") .

